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“Text without context often invites confusion and judicial adventurism.” 
 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)1 
  
  
“I think when justices disregard that kind of material [legislative history], 
it is just another way to write their own law . . . .” 
 
Senator Arlen Specter (then R-Penn.)2 
  
  
“Justice Scalia is of the opinion that most expressions of legislative histo-
ry . . . are not entitled to great weight . . . . Now, obviously, I have great 
regard for Justice Scalia, his intellect and legal reasoning. But, of 
course, . . . I don’t really agree with his position.” 
 
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa)3 
 
 
Until the late 1980s, few questioned judges’ use of legislative his-
tory to resolve statutory ambiguity.4  The Constitution says nothing 
 
 ∗ Victoria Nourse, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center.  Thanks to those at work-
shops at Yale, Minnesota, DePaul, and Georgetown who, over the past two years, have lis-
tened to parts of this argument.  Special thanks to William Eskridge, Lawrence Solum, 
Louis Seidman, and Randy Barnett. 
 1 Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 43, 43 (1988).  
 2 Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, 48 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 
913, 917 (1990).  
 3 Transcript:  Day Three of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings, WASH. POST (Spet. 14, 2005, 1:45 
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/14/
AR2005091401451.html (speaking at the confirmation hearing of Chief Justice John 
Roberts). 
 4 Textualists and their critics agree upon the hundred-year reign of legislative history.  See, 
e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 679 
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barring courts from using any aid helpful and relevant to interpretive 
decisions.  Since the Founding, Supreme Court lawyers have cited the 
journals of the House and Senate.5  As Chief Justice John Marshall 
once explained “[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of 
the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived.”6 
Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing through the 1990s, 
agencies, academics, and judges began to assert, with increasing stri-
dency, the notion that using legislative history is unconstitutional.7  
Textualism’s most insistent advocates8 decried recourse to legislative 
 
(1997) (“For more than a century, the Supreme Court has consulted a further text—the 
legislative history—to determine intent when the statutory text is unclear.”); John C. 
Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, 
and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 491 (2001) (arguing that the use of 
legislative history has been “dominant in the federal courts for most of the last one hun-
dred years . . . ”). 
 5 The Venus, Rae, Master, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 264 (1814) (counsel citing the state-
ment of “Mr. Russell in a committee report” from the House journal); Id. at 261 (counsel 
citing an amendment in the Senate for the proposition that Congress did not mean to au-
thorize the capture of property belonging to mere inhabitants of a hostile country be-
cause the law had been amended in the Senate to cover “subjects” of hostile nations).  See 
also Menard v. Aspasia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 505, 509 (1831) (counsel referring to journals of 
Congress on knowledge of slavery in passing northwest ordinance); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 214 (1821) (counsel referring to House and Senate Journals on the 
practice of issuing contempt orders); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 255, 
261 (1802) (counsel citing journals of old Congress on question of land grant).  Even Jus-
tices cited the journals.  See, e.g., Roach v. Commonwealth, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 206 (1793) 
(Justice M’Kean referring to a “legislative construction” of a statute—a series of statutes, 
in fact—as to the amount to be paid for a military uniform, citing to state legislative jour-
nals).  For more cases on citation to the journals for statutory and constitutional interpre-
tation, see infra notes 131-35. 
 6 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805); see also Gardner v. The Collec-
tor, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499, 511 (1867) (“[O]n principle as well as authority . . . whenever a 
question arises in a court of law of the existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute 
took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the judges who are called upon to decide 
it, have a right to resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of conveying 
to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question; always seeking first for 
that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a different 
rule.”) (emphasis added). 
 7 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 84 n.52 (2006) [hereinafter, Manning, Divides] (“In previous writing, I have argued 
that textualists’ rejection of legislative history is best explained by reference to the consti-
tutional norm against legislative self-delegation.”) (citing Manning, supra note 4 at 710–
25); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 35 
(1997) (purporting that reliance on legislative history is unconstitutional)(“The legisla-
tive power is the power to make laws, not the power to make legislators.  It is nondelega-
ble.”). 
 8 See Roberts, supra note 4, at 493 (“In recent years . . . a new kind of attack on the use of 
legislative history has emerged.  Popularized by Justice Scalia, this line of argument is that 
the use of legislative history . . . is actually inconsistent with Article I of the Constitu-
tion.”).  Professor Roberts recounts the history of the emergence of the critique of legisla-
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history as “illegitimate” and “shameful.”9  In fact, this constitutional 
question has produced far less analysis than it merits.  It is one thing 
to reject unreliable snippets of legislative history, or the use of legisla-
tive history to find “intent”;10 it is quite another to decree that legisla-
tive history shall never be considered as a constitutional matter—a posi-
tion not seriously entertained until Justice Antonin Scalia made it a 
cause célèbre in the late twentieth century.11  To make matters even 
odder, the constitutional arguments against legislative history are for 
the most part ignored by federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, which continues to cite legislative history.12 
In this Article, I provide an extended analysis13 of the constitu-
tional claims against legislative history, arguing that, under textual-
ists’ own preference for constitutional text, the use of legislative his-
tory should be constitutional to the extent it is supported by 
Congress’s rulemaking power, a constitutionally enumerated power. 14 
 
tive history.  Id. at 497.   Professor William N. Eskridge also recounts the critique.  Profes-
sor William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998). 
 9 As Justice Antonin Scalia has explained:  “The greatest defect of legislative history is its 
illegitimacy.  We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”  Conroy v. 
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Al-
dridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)); see also ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting in part) (“We in the judiciary have become shamelessly 
profligate and unthinking in our use of legislative history . . . .”). 
 10 See Manning, supra note 4, at 677 (“[T]extualists contend that . . . a multi-member legisla-
ture has no actual collective intent on the (ambiguous) points it has not explicitly re-
solved . . . .”).  But see Victoria Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation:  Rethinking Legisla-
tive Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2014) (arguing that this claim is wrong and 
misleading, that Congress plans (and in this sense has intent) through its procedures, 
and that the term “intent” is a misleading proxy for gaining meaning through “context”). 
 11 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 7 at 31 (“I object to the use of legislative history on 
principle, since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of law.”); Id. at 34 
(“It is less that the courts refer to legislative history because it exists than that legislative 
history exists because the courts refer to it.”). 
 12 Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (rejecting the Scalia 
position). 
 13 Others have made significant but partial arguments.  See James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls 
and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1218–24 (2010) 
(mentioning Section 5, focusing on the Journal Clause as supporting reference to legisla-
tive history) [hereinafter Brudney, Shortfalls]; Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative His-
tory in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1473 (2000) (rejecting textual-
ists’ nondelegation argument).  This Article differs because it deals with all of the 
constitutional objections—bicameralism, nondelegation, and the separation of powers—
and does so on the basis of textualists’ own constitutional theories.  Beyond this, it applies 
my structural analysis of the Constitution, see infra notes 205-31 and accompanying text, 
which has never been brought to bear on this particular problem. 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, 
expel a Member.”). 
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This Article has five Parts.  In Part I, I explain the importance of 
this question, considering the vast range of cases to which this claim 
of unconstitutionality could possibly apply—after all, statutory inter-
pretation cases are the vast bulk of the work of the federal courts.  I 
also explain why these claims should be of greater concern to a varie-
ty of constitutional theorists, particularly those who embrace theories 
of popular and common law constitutionalism, but as well to original-
ists. 
In Part II, I consider the textualist arguments against the constitu-
tionality of legislative history.  Article I, Section 7 provides that any 
bill must pass the House and the Senate and be presented to the 
President for veto or signature.15  As a number of textualists have ar-
gued, legislative history is not passed by both houses or signed by the 
President.16  Call this the “bicameralism argument.”17  My answer to 
the bicameralism argument lies in a constitutional text that statutory 
textualists seem to have forgotten:  Article I, Section 5 gives explicit 
power to Congress to set its own procedures, a power that gives legit-
imacy to legislative history created pursuant to those procedures. 18  In 
fact, new developments in statutory interpretation theory (decision 
process theory) suggest that, in some cases, the only way to resolve 
textual conflict is to consider legislative procedure.19 
In Part III, I consider a second prominent argument against the 
constitutionality of legislative history:  non-delegation. Critics argue 
that Congress may not delegate the “legislative power” granted under 
the Constitution to members or committees, as only the entire Congress 
may constitutionally exercise that power.  Call this the “non-
 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill . . . shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to 
the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return 
it, with his Objections . . . .”). 
 16 Manning, supra note 4, at 695 (“[T]extualists argue that crediting unenacted expressions 
of legislative intent contravenes the constitutional requirement of bicameralism and pre-
sentment.”). 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill . . . shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to 
the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return 
it, with his Objections . . . .”).  See John Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 S. CT. REV. 
113, 167–68 (2011) (“Simply put, if the statute and the legislative history genuinely con-
flict, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution itself gives the text a greater claim to authori-
tativeness.”). 
 18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, 
expel a Member.”). 
 19 See generally Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History 
by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012). 
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delegation” argument.20  Again, my response is based on constitution-
al text:  Article I, Section 5 specifically sanctions delegation to less 
than the whole of Congress; more importantly, there is no general 
norm against self-delegation stated explicitly or even implicitly in the 
Constitution.  Finally, I suggest that there is a certain inconsistency in 
the assertion of these claims:  the non-self-delegation and bicameral-
ism arguments can both be used to indict canons of construction, 
which textualists offer as the leading alternative to legislative history, 
but which have no supporting text comparable to Article I section 5 
in the Constitution. 
In Part IV, I consider arguments that judges’ use of legislative his-
tory violates the separation of powers because it allows the legislature 
to exceed the bounds of the “judicial power.”21  This argument can 
rather easily be turned on its head:  in the quotations offered at the 
beginning of this article, members of Congress argue that judges are 
exercising the “legislative power” when they rewrite statutes without 
considering legislative history.  As has been argued at length else-
where, the use of “adjectival” argument in structural controversies—
relying upon the terms “legislative, executive, and judicial”—
perpetuates a weak understanding of the separation of powers, and 
one that the Constitution’s own text belies.22  The separation of pow-
ers does not prevent recourse to legislative history; in fact, as the Arti-
cle explains, blindness to legislative history may create different kinds 
of structural risks—risks to federalism, rather than risks to the separa-
tion of powers. 
Finally, in Part V, I conclude by suggesting that we should retire 
the strong form of the legislative history unconstitutionality argu-
ment, by which I mean the claim that the constitution bars any and 
 
 20 Manning, supra note 4, at 675 (“[T]extualism should be understood as a means of im-
plementing a central . . . element of the separation of powers—the prohibition against 
legislative self-delegation.”).  The full scholarly exegesis of this argument appears in 
Manning.  Id.  As a matter of fact, this happens, but in reverse order:  the whole body has 
the opportunity to reject or amend the bill precisely because of any statements made in 
the committee report about its meaning.  See Siegel, supra note 13, at 1459 (2000). 
 21 The most prominent constitutional debate in statutory interpretation has centered 
around the nature of the “judicial power,” an approach which I reject here, as incapable 
of either resolving the question or of asking the correct question.  See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:  Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpre-
tation 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001) (explaining that judicial statutory inter-
pretation takes into account the “spirit of the law” and fundamental values); John F. 
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 42–43 (2001).  See in-
fra text accompanying notes 169–70 (arguing against an adjectival view of the separation 
of powers). 
 22 Victoria Nourse, Toward a “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: The Federalist Papers 
as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 470–71 (1996); see discussion infra Part IV. 
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all legislative history.  Instead, we should far more actively interrogate 
serious questions about the use of legislative history in particular cas-
es.  Can it really be wise—or even constitutional—for a judge to im-
pose a meaning on an ambiguous statute with reference to the state-
ments of a filibustering minority, or privilege some texts in ways that 
violate Congress’s rules?23  Fidelity to Congress, and the importance 
of Congress’s constitutional rules—what Francis Lieber once called 
the “common law” of the Congress24—has yet to be theorized within 
this more pressing, but particular, sphere. 
I.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Many scholars have asserted that the legislative history question is 
a constitutional one,25 yet there has been a relative lack of extended 
constitutional analysis.  Dozens of articles mention arguments against 
the constitutionality of legislative history, but fewer than a handful 
examine arguments supporting its constitutionality.26  Most lawyers, 
scholars and judges simply assume, without articulating precisely why, 
the use of legislative history is constitutional.  This reflects the bare 
 
 23 These claims are all supported in Nourse,  supra note 19, at 106–09 (describing an opin-
ion in which Justice Rehnquist relies upon a minority report and statements of those who 
filibustered the 1964 Civil Rights Act; describing a case in which Justice William Brennan 
and Justice Anthony Kennedy discussed a term that would have been ignored by Con-
gress). 
 24 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 188–89 (3rd ed. 1877). 
 25 For some of the scholars suggesting that the matter is a constitutional question, see Jerry 
L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 827, 843 (1991) (arguing that constitutionally oriented arguments explain 
“why this court takes that approach with respect to those issues in a way that legitimates its 
stance. . .”); Manning, supra note 4 at 695 (arguing that textualism emphasizes aspects of 
constitutional structure); Daniel Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 
GEO. L. J. 281, 284 (1989) (arguing that one must consider a statutory interpretation 
method that is consistent with this country’s constitutional government); Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (arguing 
Congress’s power to codify a particular interpretive method is a constitutional question).  
This is so despite the fact that there is serious disagreement about whether there is a con-
stitutional question to be answered.  Some scholars insist that “[c]ourts must choose in-
terpretive doctrines on largely empirical grounds . . . .” Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive 
Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 77 (2000). 
 26 See Roberts, supra note 4, at 566–67 (arguing that delegation to committees is constitu-
tional); Siegel, supra note 13, at 1527 (2000) (arguing against the non-delegation claim).  
See also James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:  Idle 
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42–47 (1994) (considering legislative su-
premacy and the separation of powers as supporting references to legislative history) 
[hereinafter Brudney, Commentary]; Brudney, Shortfalls, supra note 13, at 1218–24 (men-
tioning Section 5, focusing on the Journal Clause as supporting reference to legislative 
history). 
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bones fact that legislative materials remain a tool routinely used in 
federal courts everyday.  As the Supreme Court has written: 
As for the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense 
suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information ra-
ther than ignoring it . . . . . Legislative history materials are not generally 
so misleading that jurists should never employ them in a good-faith effort 
to discern legislative intent. Our precedents demonstrate that the Court’s 
practice of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past.  We sus-
pect that the practice will likewise reach well into the future.27 
At the outset, it is important to understand that more is at stake in 
the legislative history debate than constitutionalists typically imagine.  
Despite the rather assertive claims made by legislative history’s critics, 
constitutionalists have never weighed in on the issue with great vigor.  
This should seem surprising for a number of reasons.  First, statutes 
are the life-blood of the judicial caseload; legislative history’s oppo-
nents concede the importance of statutory law.28  Second, statutory 
interpretation and judicial review, in the constitutional sense, are 
tethered:  if statutory practice becomes untethered from legitimate 
deference to Congress, that imperils the legitimacy of judicial review 
more generally.  Third, a court that rewrites a statute contrary to 
Congress’s meaning may not only create a counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty (typically associated with constitutional law), but also a superma-
joritarian difficulty.29  Fourth, the textualist argument against the con-
stitutionality of legislative history poses serious challenges to leading 
constitutional theories, such as common law30 and popular constitu-
tionalism.31 
 
 27 Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 612 (1991) (citing United States v. 
Fisher 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358, 386 (1805)); see, e.g., Wallace v. Parker 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 680, 
687–90 (1832) (providing an example of the Ohio Supreme Court engaging in statutory 
interpretation). 
 28 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 3 (2014) (“[A] substantial majority of the 
Supreme Court’s caseload involves statutory construction (nearly two-thirds of its recent 
docket by one estimate.”); see also SCALIA, supra note 7.  
 29 Victoria F. Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress:  Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian 
Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L. J. 1119, 1165 (2011). 
 30 See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 31 Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 191 (2008) (arguing that a certain understanding of Heller illustrates discipline 
and discretion in constitutional interpretation that originalism precludes); see also LARRY 
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999). 
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A.  A Republic of Many, Many Statutes32 
Although one might not know it from the law reviews or even the 
first year law school curriculum, statutory interpretation is important.  
It is very important.  Statutes are the lifeblood of American law.  Alt-
hough the legal curriculum still prizes a heavy dose of the common 
law, there has been a glacially slow but noticeable move to teaching 
statutes and regulations in the first year.  This reflects what Justice 
Scalia has declared—that “we live in age of legislation”,33 the common 
law having been overtaken by what Professors William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn have dubbed a “republic of statutes.”34  If this is cor-
rect, then, it behooves those who care about the Constitution to pay 
attention to arguments that affect almost every statutory case.  If Jus-
tice Scalia is correct, then vast numbers of lawyers and judges are vio-
lating the Constitution in statutory cases.  Presumably, constitutional-
ists should care about what could be the most significant (in terms of 
number of cases) constitutional claim made in decades.  Forget about 
the legislative veto or the right to die, in terms of the raw number of 
cases, the legislative history question deserves greater constitutional 
attention. 
B.  Judicial Review and Statutory Interpretation 
Even if the sheer volume of cases affected did not favor such at-
tention, constitutional theory should.  Although it is generally not 
conceived of in this way, judicial review and statutory interpretation 
are tethered in practice.  Statutory cases are common; they are the 
baseline from which constitutional cases are thought to diverge.  
They are also the baseline of legitimacy from which judicial review is 
often justified.  To those who find these debates mundane as a consti-
tutional matter, it must be remembered that statutory interpretation 
cannot be disengaged from the performance of the Supreme Court 
as a whole, and that includes constitutional review.  The very defer-
ence granted to Congress in statutory interpretation cases gives cred-
ibility to the claim that the Supreme Court only exercises its greatest 
power to strike down laws in the odd constitutional, not the normal 
statutory, case.  A court that rewrites law in the statutory realm risks 
 
 32 WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, ABBE GLUCK & VICTORIA NOURSE, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2014). 
 33 SCALIA, supra note 7, at 12. 
 34 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:  THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010). 
Nov. 2014] THE CONSTITUTION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 321 
 
disturbing the “economy of trust”35 needed to permit it to exercise 
more dramatic exercises of judicial review. 
C.  The Supermajoritarian Difficulty 
The entire question of judicial review has been framed as justify-
ing judicial “overruling” of the legislature and its counter-
majoritarian effect.36  There has been no comparable attention to 
statutory interpretation even though the cases are more frequent and 
the effects may be even more disrespectful of majorities.  In statutory 
interpretation cases, “courts have no long or overt tradition of self-
conscious constitutional self-control,”37 despite the obvious danger 
that interpretive review, just like judicial review, may create not only a 
counter-majoritarian difficulty, but also a “supermajoritarian difficul-
ty.”38  As I have described at length elsewhere, it is possible (and more 
than possible, one can demonstrate this in particular cases) that 
judges have sought to enforce counter-majoritarian meanings—the 
meaning asserted by the statute’s opponents.39  If this is correct, given 
the fact that all legislation requires a supermajority in the Senate,40 it 
is possible that a court in a statutory interpretation case, when it errs, 
is erring on the side of a very distinct minority (in theory as little as 
less than 15 percent of the population and even less of the elec-
torate).41  A court that rewrites a statute contrary to the will of the 
people is in one sense no different than a court that exercises judicial 
review:  it writes its own laws with no popular mandate—but in an-
other sense (given the supermajoritarian difficulty) it may be acting 
in ways that may be more grievously inconsistent with majoritarian-
ism, if it assumes that it is simple for Congress to reverse the courts’ 
errors. 
 
 35 SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 331–52 (2011). 
 36 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.”). 
 37 Nourse, supra note 29, at 1165. 
 38 Id. at 1128–33 (discussing and naming the “supermajoritarian difficulty”). 
 39 Nourse, supra note 19, at 120 (explaining that Justice Stevens’s opinion in Bock Laundry, 
to the extent it advocated the common law rules, was advocating for a position rejected in 
conference); id. at 107 (explaining that Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in United Steelworkers 
v. Weber relied upon opponents to the bill). 
 40 See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING:  NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES 
IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (4th ed. 2012). 
 41  This follows from the fact that there is equal state representation without regard to popu-
lation.  So, in theory, the eleven smallest states can block any bill in the Senate.  SANFORD 
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:  WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG 
(AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 49–62 (2006). 
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It is often assumed that the risk of statutory interpretation is less 
serious than the question of judicial review because Congress may re-
verse the results of an improper judicial decision based on statutory 
grounds but not in constitutional cases.  In fact, this misunderstands 
the legislative process. No court’s statutory ruling fails to change the 
legislative calculus.  When the parties return to Congress to plead 
their case, the court’s decision will brand one side of the congres-
sional debate with the mark of legal legitimacy.  When the losing par-
ty in court is a detested minority, or even a latent majority or super-
majority, the court’s decision may be just as fatal as a constitutional 
ruling. 42 
This argues for more, rather than less, concern about judicial 
power to rewrite statutes.  Indeed, it argues for greater rather than 
lesser attention to the constitutional implications of statutory inter-
pretation.  In this sense, Justice Scalia’s textualist critique has done an 
enormous service to the field of statutory interpretation, raising the 
constitutional profile of an issue that has not been seen as particular-
ly important.  By the same token, purposivists and other critics of tex-
tualism have done themselves no good deed by marginalizing the 
constitutional arguments, rather than meeting them head on with se-
rious arguments taken from constitutional text and structure. 
D.  Importance for Constitutional Theory 
Constitutional theorists should be more interested in this debate 
from purely selfish perspectives.  Common law constitutionalists,43 
those who rely upon stare decisis to constrain judges, should be con-
cerned that a longstanding practice—a common law of statutory in-
terpretation—is under assault.44  From their vantage point, textualists’ 
 
 42 Even when the court invites congressional intervention, it may not occur for decades.  See 
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 276–77 (1972) (inviting Congress to change the courts’ own 
rulings exempting baseball from antitrust law, after 50 years of invitations which were de-
clined).  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 637 (4th ed. 
2007) (explaining that Congress did not react to this invitation for decades).  Of course, 
it is also possible that, in politically marginal cases, the Court’s ruling can spur congres-
sional action by signaling the weakness of a minority position.  In FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., the court refused to uphold the Administration’s attempt to regu-
late use of tobacco, referring the matter to Congress, which in fact then acted, despite the 
traditional strength of the tobacco lobby.  529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000); Melissa Healy, The 
Tobacco Law: What the FDA Can and Can’t Do, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at E1. 
 43 STRAUSS, supra note 30; see Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 452 (2010). 
 44 Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:  Erie for the Age of Statutes, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 755 (2013) (“[F]ederal courts have spent the last century en-
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refusal to look at legislative history should stand as a radical form of 
judicial activism, since it seeks to overturn a practice textualists 
acknowledge has at least one hundred years of precedent to support 
it.45  As Thomas Merrill has written, Congress has not only enumerat-
ed powers, it has the common law “disposing power,” by which he 
means the power to “determine[] who has the authority to make law 
and under what circumstances.”46  Yet it is unclear whether textualists 
or purposivists are willing to respect something far less grand—
Congress’s procedural power to set the rules of decision by which law 
is made and interpreted. 
Popular constitutionalists, as well, should be interested in the de-
bate because it raises issues about the role of the courts relative to 
Congress.  Popular constitutionalism holds that Congress’s constitu-
tional determinations should be given great weight and that courts 
should not have supreme power in the field of constitutional law.47  In 
the field of statutory interpretation, popular constitutionalists, like 
common law constitutionalists, should be concerned that existing 
theories of statutory interpretation—whether textualism or purposiv-
ism—erode Congress’s role in statutory interpretation.  Neither tex-
tualists nor purposivists pay much attention to congressional proce-
dure—the means by which the legislature makes its decisions.  A 
popular constitutionalist should worry, as I suggest here, that Con-
gress’s constitutional constituencies—the people—are being cut out 
of the process of statutory as well as constitutional interpretation, 
which may be a far more serious assault on a republican legal order. 
Originalists, whether those who support a living version or not,48 
should as well be concerned with this issue.  Recent developments in 
statutory interpretation theory, such as decision process theory, reveal 
the importance of legislative rules of proceedings in interpreting text.  
Some originalists have invoked analogous rules of proceedings in the 
context of the creation of the Constitution to support their theories 
of originalism.49  Although the traditional “originalist” debate about 
 
gaged in an under-the-radar enterprise of fashioning and applying what are arguably 
hundreds of federal common law doctrines to questions of federal statutory interpreta-
tion, without acknowledging that they are doing so . . . .”). 
 45 See Manning, Delegation, supra note 4, at 759. 
 46 Merrill, supra note 43, at 454. 
 47 For full arguments supporting this claim, see Siegel, supra note 31, at 191; Jeremy Wal-
dron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J. 1346 (2006); see also 
KRAMER, supra note 31; TUSHNET, supra note 31. 
 48 Compare JOHN O MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION (2013), with JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 49 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 48, at 1-18. 
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legislative history has been about the meaning of “judicial” power,50 
these recent developments suggest that the originalist question may 
have been misphrased, which is to say that the question is not wheth-
er legislative history is within the “judicial” power historically, but 
whether the founding recognition of the importance of rules of pro-
ceedings51 should affect the legislative history debate. 
Finally, constitutionalists in general should be concerned that 
while they have been spending an inordinate amount of time on the 
question of constitutional fidelity,52 there is a relative dearth of consti-
tutional analysis on legislative fidelity.53  In fact, legislative supremacy 
in statutory matters is a wildly undertheorized constitutional princi-
ple, although it traces to the Founding. At its most stringent, legisla-
tive supremacy suggests that courts must assiduously seek to put 
themselves in the place of the legislature in deciding questions of 
statutory ambiguity—acting as if they were the legislature.54  At its 
most lenient, legislative supremacy means that courts may exercise a 
fair amount of discretion, but may not “disobey” Congress.55  Some-
where in the middle is “deference as respect,” whereby deference 
amounts to a “judicial attitude of respectful attention to the reasons 
which are or could be offered in support of a legal authority’s deci-
sion.”56  Almost all such theories have been stated at such a level of 
generality, however, that they do not seem particularly helpful in an-
swering the far more specific constitutional claims against legislative 
history, examined below. 
II.  THE BICAMERALISM ARGUMENT RECONSIDERED 
Those decreeing legislative history unconstitutional typically begin 
by invoking Article I, Section 7—the Bicameralism Clause. 57  They ar-
 
 50 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:  Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); John F. Man-
ning, Textualism and the Equity of the State, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001).   
 51 For discussion of the early recognition of the importance of legislative rules of proceed-
ing, see infra Part II.A. 
 52 See, e.g., Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997). 
 53 There are, of course, exceptions.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Amorous De-
fendant:  Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2450, 2460 
(1990) (discussing the relational agent). 
 54 Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431, 432 
(1989) (pointing out that Aristotle called on judges to “imagine how the legislators would 
have addressed [an] issue had they foreseen it . . .”). 
 55 See generally Farber, supra note 25. 
 56 DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, JUDGES AND UNJUST LAWS:  COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 158 (2008). 
 57 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 4, at 676, 695-96. 
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gue that legislative history is not passed by both Houses of Congress 
or signed by the President and therefore violates the Bicameralism 
Clause. 58  The first and most obvious answer to this claim is to turn to 
another relevant and more specific constitutional text:  the Rules of 
Proceedings Clause.  In Article I, Section 5, the Constitution specifi-
cally grants to each house of Congress the power to set its own rules:  
“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”59  No 
one seriously contends that Congress acts unconstitutionally when it 
creates legislative history, when Senators speak or committees write 
reports—such a rule could entirely disable the body.60  Nor do courts 
seriously contend that the Constitution does not commit to Congress, 
and, even more particularly, each House of Congress, the power to 
create its own rules.61  Put in other words, the Constitution recognizes 
the principle of bicameralism in some cases and its opposite in other 
cases—that each House has constitutional authority to act inde-
pendently of the other. 
A.  The Constitutional Text Statutory Textualists Forgot:  The Rules of 
Proceedings Clause 
From the very Founding, when the constitutional convention cre-
ated rules, and delegated authority to committees for important 
drafting tasks, legislative bodies have been held to have wide power to 
create their own procedures.62  Justice Joseph Story once explained: 
 
 58 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote:  A Response to Professor Siegel, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1530, 1538-40; John F. Manning, Second Generation Textualism, 98 
CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1292 (2010). 
 59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 60 The major empirical studies confirm that, at least as far as staffers are concerned, Con-
gress is not about to give up legislative history.  See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, 
The Politics of Legislative Drafting:   A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002); 
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empiri-
cal Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 
(2013).  For a comprehensive explanation of why legislative history matters to members 
of Congress and why members do in fact rely upon things like committee reports for 
making decisions, see Brudney, Commentary, supra note 26, at 27–28.  See also Nourse & 
Schacter, supra note 60, at 607. 
 61 See infra note 153 and accompanying text.   
 62 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 xxii–xxiii (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
(mentioning the formation of general principles and regulations in the early sessions of 
the Constitutional Convention).  The Committee on Detail added many provisions to the 
Constitution now considered vital, including the Vesting Clauses, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, and the Rulemaking Clause.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937); see also id. at 177, 185, 186 (vesting claus-
es); id. at 180 (RulemakingClause); id. at 182 (Necessary and Proper Clause).  
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No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing each 
house to determine the rules of its own proceedings.  If the power did not 
exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, 
either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order.  The humblest 
assembly of men is understood to possess this power, and it would be absurd 
to deprive the councils of the nation of a like authority.63 
The Rulemaking Clause sanctions procedures determined by each 
individual House. 64  The Constitution thus embraces deviations from 
bicameralism—each House of Congress may set its own rules.  In fact, 
the bicameralism clause acknowledges that there is a difference be-
tween a “Law”—a status achieved only after the President has given 
his approval—and the “Bill” created prior to such approval.65  Textu-
alists have argued that legislative history is not “law,”66—but neither is 
the text of the bill that has passed both Houses.  Bill text is text, but does 
not become “Law” until it is signed by the President. 
If this is correct, then the Constitution provides an affirmative tex-
tual argument for Congress’s procedures and, to this extent, the 
products of those procedures (i.e. legislative history).67  Imagine if the 
Constitution gave courts the express power to create “rules for X.”  
Could another department constitutionally blind itself to the rules 
the judiciary had created pursuant to such a constitutional authoriza-
tion?  There can be no question that the courts would, if given an ex-
press power to create rules or procedures, demand respect for that 
power from other branches, namely the President and the Congress.  
So, too, should the judicial branch respect and understand Con-
gress’s rules and proceedings. 
 
 63 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 837, at 
588 (4th ed. 1873). 
 64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”). 
 65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill . . . shall, before it become a Law, be presented to 
the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return 
it, with his Objections . . . .”). 
 66 SCALIA, supra note 4, at 31 (“I object to the use of legislative history on principle, since I 
reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of law.”) 
 67 In theory, one might distinguish between evidence of a change in text, or procedural or 
statutory history, from statements about the text or legislative history.  In fact, the easiest 
way to find procedural or statutory changes is through reference to legislative history ex-
plaining those changes. 
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B.  Section 5 and Decision Process Theory:  Why Congress’s Rules are 
Important In Interpreting Congress’s Texts 
Others have noted the importance of the Rulemaking Clause,68 
but this clause has suffered the more general fate of theories of statu-
tory interpretation, which largely ignore Congress.  As Jerry Mashaw 
has explained, neither purposivism nor textualism have a positive 
theory of Congress.69  For purposivists, Congress’s rules perform little 
role in disciplining the use of legislative history. 70 Textualists, as a 
general matter, find Congress’s procedures unfathomable, “arbi-
trary,” and “idiosyncratic,”71 even as they concede that failure to at-
tend to text “disrespects the legislative process.”72  Neither textualists 
nor purposivists focus on the overt textual basis for congressional de-
cisionmaking:  Section 5 of Article I of the Constitution. 
Section 5 gives express authority to create legislative materials and 
in this sense sanctions legislative history.73  More importantly for my 
purposes, it gives express authority to congressional “rules of pro-
ceedings”—to a sequential process of decisionmaking subject to pro-
cedures created by each House of Congress.  Developments in statu-
tory interpretation theory show that textual interpretation depends, 
crucially, on seeing how the rules affect the creation of statutory text, 
 
 68 Brudney, Shortfalls, supra note 15, at 1218–24 (mentioning Section 5, focusing on the 
journal clause); Brudney, Commentary, supra note 26, at 41–47 (discussing the separation 
of powers and legislative supremacy, mentioning Section 5); see Roberts, supra note 4, at 
496 (stating that Section 5 is integral to the enactment process and provides authority to 
committee reports). 
 69 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 123–60 (1989) (arguing that without a positive theory of politics, normative theo-
ries may be unavailing). 
 70 Nourse, supra note 19, at 87 (“Purposivists are as oblivious of congressional rules as are 
textualists . . . .”). 
 71 John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 431 (2005) (“Legis-
lative outcomes necessarily hinge on arbitrary (or at least nonsubstantive) factors such as 
the sequence in which alternatives are presented.”); id. at 432 (“[I]f a bill’s final shape 
depends to a large extent on these varied procedural idiosyncracies . . . .”); id. at 441 
(“Textualists . . . chalk up statutory awkwardness to the (unknowable) exigencies of a leg-
islative process with many and diverse veto points.”); id. at 450 (“The legislative process is 
untidy and opaque.”). 
 72 Manning, Divides, supra note 7, at 73, 74, 77 (describing Congress’s procedures as “un-
traceable,” subject to “manipulation,” “strategic” behavior, “often messy”).  
 73 Roberts, supra note 4, at 503 (asserting Congress’s Article I Section 5 power to determine 
its own rules of proceedings); Brudney, Shortfalls, supra note 13, at 1218 (describing the 
Section 5 requirement that each House record both votes and overall proceedings); 
Brudney, Commentary, supra note 26, at 79–80 (considering the institutional importance of 
committee reports and the fact that members of Congress regularly rely on them when 
deciding how to vote). 
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a theory known as “decision process theory” or “decision theory.”74  
To the extent that Section 5 gives constitutional legitimacy to con-
gressional procedures, it provides explicit constitutional support for 
that theory.  Decision process theory argues that courts cannot un-
derstand statutory text and statutory history (history typically em-
braced by textualists) and in some cases it cannot even find the prop-
er text without recourse to legislative procedure and legislative 
context.  In fact, it makes the unconventional claim that (at least in 
some cases) legislative history may be necessary to interpret statutory 
text. 
Consider the following example of the basic proposition that re-
course to procedure is relevant to understanding the priority of statu-
tory texts.  Knowing something as simple as whether statutory text en-
tered the process as an amendment can be important to textual 
interpretation.  Text amending the original bill may take prece-
dence,75 not only because it is later in the sequential process, but also 
because it reflects an important qualification to the underlying bill.  
There should be nothing particularly controversial about this since 
courts have recognized that later, more specific, statutes qualify earli-
er ones.76  But this basic principle has not been applied to under-
standing textual construction. 
Consider United Steelworkers v. Weber, a leading anti-discrimination 
case, perhaps one of the most fraught statutory interpretation cases 
ever decided.  In that case, there were three relevant texts, sections 
703(a), 703(d), and 703(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.77  Knowing 
that 703(j) was the last text passed on the issue in the case (affirma-
tive action) immediately before closing debate on a filibuster, should 
be crucial in statutory interpretation, qualifying inferences from oth-
er texts—703(j) was a crucial price for bill passage.78  And, yet, rather 
than focusing on sequence, the Weber majority and dissent relied up-
on isolated statements from members, supporters, and opponents 
 
 74 Nourse, supra note 19, at 73–74 (arguing that an empirically sound reading of legislative 
history necessitates an understanding of Congress’s rules). 
 75 This assumes a substantive change in existing germane text.  Sequence cannot be di-
vorced from substance. 
 76 FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) ("[T]he meaning of one statute 
may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and 
more specifically to the topic at hand."); see also United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 
U.S 517, 530-31 (1998). 
 77 See Nourse, supra note 19, at 105–09. 
 78 Id. 
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alike, including statements by members who filibustered the bill!79  
Decision process theory concedes that legislative history can be 
abused, but that it is most violently abused when judges ignore Con-
gress’s constitutionally sanctioned rulemaking power. 
C.  The Insufficiency of Bicameralism in Cases of Conflicting Texts 
Decision process theory goes further, however, and argues that, in 
some cases it is impossible to know the proper text of a bill without 
considering legislative process.  Bicameralism alone cannot be an an-
swer to statutes that involve contradictory or absurd texts.80  In well-
known statutory interpretation cases like Public Citizen v. Department of 
Justice, Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., and United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber,81 (all major cases taught in statutory interpretation 
courses) there was no “plain” bicameral text; there were texts deemed 
“absurd”82 or in conflict.  In Public Citizen there was a choice between 
the statutory terms “establish” and “utilize.”  In Green v. Bock Laundry, 
there was a choice between the statutory terms “witness” and “de-
fendant.” 83  In such cases, the Bicameralism Clause gives us nothing 
by which to choose one text over another.  By contrast, the Rulemak-
ing Clause, Article 1, Section 5, can. 
To see this, consider the problem that arises when new text is 
added in conference committee.  In Public Citizen v. Department of Jus-
tice and in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,84 the Supreme Court 
found the statutes “absurd”—even “unthinkable”—because of statu-
 
 79 Id. (noting Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on committee reports drafted before the bill was 
debated, opinions of the filibustering minority, and other irrelevant documents). 
 80 In such cases, canons of construction, which some judges prefer to legislative history, are 
unavailing.  See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co. 490 U.S. 504 (1989); Pub. Citizen 
v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (noting the failure of a “plain meaning” approach 
to interpretation, which in both cases led to an inconsistent or absurd result).  For an ex-
planation about why canons should be subordinate to legislative history, see infra text ac-
companying note 98 (arguing that canons, unlike legislative rules, are not specifically 
embraced by the constitutional text). 
 81 Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 
490 U.S. 504 (1989); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 82 In both Public Citizen and Green, the court found the language “absurd.”  In Green, even 
Justice Scalia concurred that the statutory language appeared “unthinkable.”  Green, 490 
U.S. at 527 (“We are confronted here with a statute which, if interpreted literally, pro-
duces an absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result.”) (Scalia, J., concurring).  Pub. Cit-
izen, 491 U.S. at 454 (“[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words 
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of . . . the absurd re-
sults which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable 
to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.”). 
 83 Green, 490 U.S. at 509-24. 
 84 Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 454; Green, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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tory text added during conference committee.85  The “absurdity” con-
clusion assumes that, for Congress, all text is created alike, but given 
the sequential ordering of text, this is simply not true.  Under Con-
gress’s rules, no member would believe that text added in conference 
committee should be given priority or even the same status as text 
passed by both houses:86  if conference committees could make sub-
stantive changes in bills, they would have more power than the bodies 
entire.  Members act in ways that recognize this basic procedural 
fact.87 
Ignoring the procedural status of the text disregards not only 
Congress’s rulemaking power, but also the Bicameralism Clause.  Take 
Public Citizen:  there, both the House and the Senate—535 mem-
bers—had passed language that easily resolved the case.  No confer-
ence committee had the authority to change that text.  And yet, the 
Supreme Court found mind-warping ambiguity and absurdity from a 
phrase added by a conference committee.88  Congress’s rules tell us 
that members are entitled to interpret material added in conference 
committee as not substantially changing text passed by both Houses,89 
precisely to avoid the problem that a part of the Congress will trump 
the agreed upon judgments of the whole. 
If this is correct, then the argument textualists use to indict legislative 
history becomes a reason courts should look to legislative history.  Textualists 
complain that much legislative history represents the work of the 
few90 and thus raises bicameralism problems:  committee reports were 
not adopted by both Houses.  But if textualists are worried about leg-
islative history adopted by “the few,”91 they should be just as, if not 
 
 85 For reference to absurdity in these cases, see supra note 82. 
 86 SENATE RULE XXVIII, STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, 112th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 52 (2011) (“Conferees shall not insert in their report matter not committed to them 
by either House, nor shall they strike from the bill matter agreed to by both Houses.”); 
Victoria F. Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 19, at 94–95 (“Conference committees can-
not—repeat, cannot—change the text of a bill where both houses have agreed to the 
same language.  Both House and Senate rules bar such changes.  These rules limit oppor-
tunism by conference committees’ members . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
 87 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 580–81 n.10 (2006) (discussing how Senators took 
names off a conference report that was changed in significant ways, prompting its revi-
sion). 
 88 See Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (discussing the 
absurdity of the phrase added by the conference committee). 
 89 See Nourse, supra note 19, at 94 n.97 (citing the rules and their application to Public Citi-
zen).   
 90 Manning, supra note 4, at 689 (“Textualists . . . argue that committee reports and spon-
sors’ statements speak only for a minority of Congress . . . .”). 
 91 As Justice Scalia has explained:  “Thus, if legislation consists of forming an ‘intent’ rather 
than adopting a text (a proposition with which I do not agree), Congress cannot leave the 
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more, worried about text adopted by the “few.”  In Public Citizen, 535 
members voted on bills that covered only advisory committees “estab-
lished” or “organized” by the executive,92 a text that resolved the case 
before the Supreme Court quite easily.  A conference committee—
the “few”—inserted the textual term “utilized” creating interpretive 
problems so significant it forced the case to the Supreme Court.  If 
one is worried that both Houses do not embrace legislative history, 
surely one should worry that both Houses did not embrace key text.93 
Skeptics will reply that the term “utilize” (the key text causing all 
the trouble in Public Citizen) was bicamerally approved language when 
the Conference Committee Report’s text94 was returned and passed 
by both Houses.  This argument simply repeats the original bicamer-
alism claim but says nothing about the impact of the Rulemaking 
Clause.  The rules provide that conference committees cannot signif-
icantly change bills.  If a court is to honor Article I, Section 5 of the 
Constitution, it must respect Congress’s Rules of Proceeding, and if 
one respects those rules, one will know that Congress’s members will 
view new conference committee language as not significantly altering 
the language already passed by both Houses. 
Critics might argue that Section 5 is somehow insignificant com-
pared to bicameralism.  In fact, Section 5 has central structural signif-
icance for Congress as a whole. Engage in a simple intellectual exper-
iment:  what happens if we eliminate Article I, Section 5 from the 
Constitution?  Well, the President or the courts might try to set Con-
gress’s rules.  And if the President or the courts were to set those 
rules, what would happen to Congress?  Just imagine the President 
standing up tomorrow and eliminating the Senate’s filibuster rule (as 
President Obama is surely tempted to do).  He who sets the rules, sets 
 
formation of that intent to a small band of its number, but must, as the Constitution says, 
form an intent of the Congress.”  Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 
516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 92 Nourse, supra note 19, at 94 (“[T]he votes in both the House and the Senate prior to the 
conference were for ‘establish’ and at the most ‘established or organized.’”). 
 93 Senate Rule XXVIII “prohibits new components of legislation from being inserted into a 
conference report.”  DAVID M. PRIMO, RULES AND RESTRAINT:  GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
AND THE DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS 7 (2007); see also CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:  A REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 780–83, 811 
(1989) (“Congress limits [the conferees’] authority to the differences between the House 
and Senate versions of the bill . . . by allowing points of order on both the House and 
Senate floors against conference reports that exceed that scope.”); id. at 812–13 (“Con-
ferees cannot remove language both chambers agree on, or insert new provisions not in 
either chamber’s version.”). 
 94 Conference Committee Reports are statutory text; they are often accompanied by joint 
explanations of the resolution of differences between the House and the Senate. 
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the agenda;95 Section 5, by giving the rule-setting power to members 
of Congress themselves, bars others from such control.  This not only 
protects each House, it protects the Congress as a whole from consti-
tutional assault by the other departments. 
Section 5 also has significance for bicameralism:  it not only pro-
tects the Congress from the other departments, it also protects the 
other departments from the Congress by reinforcing bicameralism.  
Without allowing each House to set their own rules, their distinctive-
ness as legislative bodies could be reduced substantially.  James Madi-
son famously argued in Federalist No. 51 that bicameralism was the 
insurance policy against legislative power dominating the other de-
partments.96  Modern observers agree that one of the very real ways 
that legislative power is divided is by the different rules in the House 
and the Senate—the Senate operates by supermajority, the House by 
majority.97  Indeed, one of the arguments made in the Senate against 
changing current filibuster rules is that such a rule change would 
transform the Senate into the House.  To the extent that internal 
rules create distinctive entities,98 the Rulemaking Clause supports the 
overarching structural reasons for having two houses, or a bicameral 
legislature. 
Finally, giving Section 5 its due, both as a structural provision and 
a coequal text, helps us solve what textualists have long recognized 
about the bicameralism argument—what Professor Manning has 
called the bicameralism “paradox.”99  One of the easiest responses to 
 
 95 KENNETH A. SHEPLSE, ANALYZING POLITICS:  RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 
374 (2d ed. 2010) (arguing that “[p]rocedures are required to cut through all this insta-
bility,” given that “there is no equilibrium to majority voting”). 
 96 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“[B]y so contriving the interior structure of the 
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the 
means of keeping each other in their proper places.”). 
 97 “[F]ilibuster threats are an everday fact of life, affecting all aspects of the legislative pro-
ces . . . .  The Senate is not a majority-rule chamber like the House.  In the House the ma-
jority can always prevail; in the Senate minorities can often block majorities.”  BARBARA 
SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMKING 5, 50 (4th ed. 2012). 
 98 It is not an overstatement that many Senators believe that the Senate filibuster rules ren-
der the Senate an entirely different body from the House of Representatives.  See 157 
CONG. REC. S302-04, S313 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (“I often 
hear opponents of reform claim that what I am proposing [reform of the filibuster] 
would turn the Senate into the House of Representatives because . . . 51 votes could move 
something.”); id. at S300-02 (statement of Sen. Alexander) (arguing that Sen. Harkin’s 
proposal would make legislation as it would in the House).  In fact, whether or not there 
were a cloture rule, the modes of election of the body would create differing incentives.  
This is not to say that the rules do not help to make the bodies different in character. 
 99 Manning, supra note 4, at 695 (“The nondelegation rationale . . . leads to a potential par-
adox requiring explanation . . . . [T]extualists accept that the details of statutory meaning 
may derive from sources outside the text of the enacted legislation . . . . [A]gencies and 
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the bicameral argument is its overreach.  Vast amounts of lawmaking 
do not satisfy the Bicameralism Clause.  Agency rules do not satisfy it, 
nor do canons or common law.100  Under an expansive reading of the 
Bicameralism Clause, the courts’ own precedents (as lawmaking) 
might even be unconstitutional.  However, if we limit bicameralism to 
actions taken under Article I, including the Rulemaking Clause, then 
the paradox disappears.  Only legislative law-making, leading to legis-
lative “bills,” according to the Rulemaking Clause, requires bicameral 
approval. 
D.  Answering the Critics 
Advocates of the bicameralism argument will reply with a variety 
of claims.  First, they will argue that the Rulemaking Clause does not 
authorize courts to second-guess or look behind text to see how it is 
created.  Second, they will argue that the case of textual conflict is an 
anomalous case, the more troubling one where courts look behind 
plain meaning and trump the text with legislative history.  Third, they 
will contend that looking behind the text violates the “enrolled bill 
doctrine.”  Finally, they will argue that there is no historical basis for 
judicial recourse to legislative history.  I treat each of these claims in 
turn before proceeding to arguments based on non-delegation and 
the separation of powers. 
1.  Congress’s Rules Are Not to be Ignored as Matter of Comity 
It has been said that the Rulemaking Clause renders Congress’s 
rules plenary and not subject to judicial review.101  It is certainly true 
 
courts, acting pursuant to explicit or implied delegations of authority, routinely define 
the specific meaning of general statutory texts.  In those instances, specific and binding 
legal rules emerge from a process other than bicameralism and present-
ment . . . . [T]extualists often rely on extrinsic sources, such as judicial decisions and legal 
treatises, to determine the specific meaning of codified terms of art.  There too, textual-
ists derive meaning from sources that have not undergone the legitimating process of bi-
cameralism and presentment.  Despite their devotion to bicameralism and presentment, 
textualists hardly believe that every detail of statutory meaning must emerge from the 
constitutionally-prescribed legislative process.”). 
100 Accord id. at 706 (discussing how agency rules and common law are forms of law making 
that do not satisfy the Bicameralism Clause). 
101 See, e.g., Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 
1157, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the fact that Congress did not hold a hearing 
is a nonjusticiable question).  See generally, Michael B. Miller, The Justiciability of Legislative 
Rules and the “Political” Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1990) (arguing that 
courts accord special deference to procedural rules).  Here, of course, the political ques-
tion doctrine is not applicable because one is not asking a court to invalidate congres-
sional rules, simply to use them in cases of textual conflict or ambiguity. 
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that courts have generally deferred to Congress’s rulemaking, sug-
gesting in their earliest cases on the topic that “all matters of method 
are open to the determination of the house” at issue.102  One might 
think from this proposition that courts have announced a principle 
of comity and respect for the rules.103  There is nothing inconsistent 
with that principle, and the judicial use of legislative history, however.  
In fact, it can be argued that this principle of comity supports judicial 
rule-deference.  Presumably, one does not defer to a rule by ignoring 
or disobeying it.  The very idea that courts may not violate the pre-
sumption of regularity of Congress’s process,104 suggests that there is 
nothing odd, much less unconstitutional, about deferring to Con-
gress’s “regular order” as an interpretive device. 
Recourse to congressional procedure as interpretive “context” 
does not require courts to judge the validity of a congressional rule or 
practice.  To be sure, scholars have advocated more aggressive proce-
dural review, urging that Congress be held to a “due process” of law-
making.105  But the claim being made in this Article is about interpre-
tation, not validity.  When a statute is ambiguous, when choices need 
to be made about conflicting texts, a court should not plead igno-
rance of legislative procedure that may resolve the interpretive gap.106  
If, after all, Congress is presumed to know the existing state of the 
law, including judicial interpretations,107 should not the courts be pre-
sumed to know the basic law of congressional procedure?  It is one 
thing for courts to defer to the rules in a case challenging their validi-
ty; it is another for courts to disregard the very existence of basic rules 
that any congressman would know and which help to resolve inter-
pretive problems.  There is a difference between deference and 
 
102 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). 
103 To be sure, one of the reasons (rightly) that courts have deferred is because they recog-
nize that Section 5 has important structural implications.  See, e.g., Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 
699 F.2d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) (“[N]either [the 
Court] nor the Executive Branch may tell Congress what rules it must adopt.”). 
104 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 48 (1891) (“As all particu-
lars of compliance with the constitution are not specially required to be entered on the 
journals, such compliance will be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary. . . .”). 
105 Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 199, 239–42 (1976); Ittai 
Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1915, 1927–36 (2011). 
106 Textualists have admitted that they do not deny that judges exercise policymaking au-
thority,  See, e.g., Manning, supra note 4, at 701 (“[T]extualist judges allow that statutory 
indeterminacy, and the resulting need for norm-specification, may at times involve judges 
in the exercise of substantial policymaking discretion.”). 
107 Manning, supra note 4, at 706 (“[T]extualist judges presume that Congress is aware of 
special usage or special interpretive norms found in pre-enactment case law or treatis-
es. . . .”). 
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blindness; Courts have not in fact chosen blindness as a general prac-
tice in the area of congressional rules; they have not hesitated to 
judge whether Congress has followed its own rules108 when those rules 
affect the “legal rights, duties and relations of persons outside the leg-
islative branch.”109  That same principle should govern the use of rules 
to resolve statutory interpretation cases. 
2.  The Non-Problem of Clear Text 
Critics are likely to reply that I have emphasized anomalous cases:  
textual conflicts are one thing; the use of legislative history to sup-
plement the text is another.  Textualists have emphasized this “substi-
tution” problem in arguing that recourse to legislative history is un-
constitutional, as the legislative history is the work of the few contrary 
to the whole emphasized by the Bicameralism Clause.110  Superficially, 
the problem with this argument is empirical.  We have every reason 
to believe that the hardest cases, the ones finding their way to appel-
late courts, are not cases of clear text but cases of ambiguity, cases in-
volving the choosing of texts or the ambiguities or incompleteness of 
key terms.  Even if this empirical claim were incorrect, however, it 
should bear little normative weight:  no one believes that legislative history 
should in fact replace or supplant clear text.  On the other hand, if there is 
 
108 See  Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998) (reviewing whether the line-
item veto was consistent with the Constitution’s procedural provisions governing legisla-
tive power); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952–58 (1983) (reviewing a procedural statute 
to determine whether it was consistent with the Constitution’s procedural provisions gov-
erning legislative power); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506–09 (1969) (reviewing a 
challenge to Congress’s procedures for expulsion under Section 5 of Article I); Yellin v. 
United States, 374 U.S. 109, 110 (1963) (considering whether a committee complied with 
its own rules); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 88–89 (1949) (considering the 
quorum rules of the House); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 30–33 (1932) (consider-
ing the application of Senate Rule XXXVIII on a nomination). 
109 Manning, supra note 4, at 716 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952).  The internal citation to 
Chadha is an attempt to define Congress’s “legislative power.”  The implicit idea here is 
that anything extending outside the internal workings of the Congress, as statutes do, 
should be considered an exercise of “legislative power.” 
110 “[T]extualist judges emphasize that courts simply do not know whether most legisla-
tors . . . have read, or are even aware of, the pre-enactment interpretations contained in 
the legislative history.”  Manning, supra note 4, at 686; Manning, supra note 4, at 684 
(when relying on a committee report, “the legislative history can be authoritative evi-
dence of congressional intent only if the Court can somehow attribute the committee’s or 
sponsor’s expression of intent to Congress as a whole.  That supposition, largely unex-
amined in the Court’s older cases, has become a focal point of the textualist critique.”).  
Manning, supra note 4, at 684  (“[T[he authoritative force of such legislative history 
[committee reports] stems from the identity of its source, a subset of Congress . . . .”). 
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no clear text, the bicameralism argument disappears for there has been 
no bicamerally approved solution to the interpretive problem. 
Of course, this does not answer the objection frequently made 
that use of legislative history substitutes vague notions of “intent” for 
text.  No one would, in fact, choose such a substitution.  Arguments 
about intent, as I have written elsewhere, are confused and confus-
ing.111  They are rhetorically compelling because they suggest some-
thing internal and private.  But legislative history is neither internal 
nor private.  Committee reports do not exist within the privacy of a 
single mind; they are public records.  Even more importantly, the 
rules themselves are certainly not the province of a single mind, but a 
publicly stated product of each House.  Even if the idea of intent is 
not philosophically ineliminable when talking about individuals, it 
can be quite easily, and for good reasons, eliminated from the debate 
about legislative history.  Try it:  substitute for the term “legislative in-
tent,” the term “legislative decision” in any statutory construction ar-
gument, and you will see that little meaning is lost, except the nega-
tive (and often misleading) connotations of subjectivity associated 
with the term “intent.”112 
3.  The Irrelevance of the Enrolled Bill Doctrine 
Nothing in the somewhat arcane and embattled “enrolled bill 
doctrine”113 undermines this claim.  That ancient, much criticized, 
and recently cabined,114 doctrine holds that a court may not second 
guess the text of a bill when a claimant argues that the law passed by 
both Houses was in fact different from the “enrolled” text—that legis-
lative clerks had made an error in compiling the final bill.115  In gen-
eral, the “enrolled bill doctrine” applies in a very limited set of cases 
in which a litigant is claiming that a clerk made an error in transcrip-
tion.  In such cases, the court typically turns a blind eye to such 
claims, presuming the correctness of the “enrolled” bill. 
 
111 See generally, Nourse, supra note 10.   
112 Id. 
113 See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?:  Rethinking the “Enrolled 
Bill” Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323, 378 (2009); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 
(1892). 
114 See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 396–97 (1990) (rejecting the enrolled bill 
doctrine in an origination clause case). 
115 Although the constitutional basis of this doctrine is somewhat obscure, its principal doc-
trinal foundation is not Article I, Section 5.  See, Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 113, at 378 
(“[T]he Field Court itself did not base [the Enrolled Bill Doctrine] on . . . the Rulemaking 
Clause. . . .”). 
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Questioning clerks’ transcription skills is a far cry from decreeing 
legislative history unconstitutional.  Using legislative context to de-
termine contested or unclear meaning does not require one to con-
clude that clerks have made a scrivenors’ error.  Everyone agrees that 
“context” is important to judicial interpretation; as Justice Scalia has 
written, “in textual interpretation, context is everything.”116  Textual-
ists focus on “semantic context”; purposivists focus on “policy con-
text.”117  Decision process theory118 focuses on the “procedural con-
text” as central to understanding textual choices as well as the virtues 
and vices of different kinds of legislative history. 
To be sure, Justice Scalia has suggested that the enrolled bill doc-
trine bars any judicial review of the legislative process.119  Intrusion 
and ignorance are two different things.  Even in the case where a 
judge finds that a conference committee has added text, he or she is 
not questioning the validity of the “enrolled bill.”  Instead, this refer-
ence to Congress’s rules makes sense in the cases we have seen, Public 
Citizen and Green, when the statute appears utterly irrational and ab-
surd.  This approach does not intrude on Congress’s processes, it re-
quires that they be understood and applied:  presumably, this is far 
more respectful of Congress than assuming, as the Supreme Court 
did in Public Citizen and Green, that 535 men and women had voted 
for an absurd text, implicitly suggesting that members had collectively 
lost their minds. 
4.  The Originalist Case for Knowing Congress’s Rules 
Finally, there are those who will claim that looking to legislative 
history, even in the most sympathetic cases, has no originalist claim to 
legitimacy in interpretive matters.120  This argument cannot be that 
there is no originalist claim for legislative procedure.121  The Found-
 
116 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 7, at 37. 
117 Manning, Divides, supra note 7, at 91. 
118 Nourse, supra note 19, at 73–75. 
119 Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 409 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
120 The Rules of Proceedings clause was added to the Constitution by a committee, the 
Committee on Detail.  See, 2 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 339 (G. 
Hunt. Ed. 1987); WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 92 (1900). 
121 So, too, there is evidence of medieval British practice in which courts referred to “inten-
tion” of the legislature quite openly, by which was meant the history of Parliament’s deci-
sion. See, e.g., THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE 
FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 49 (1922) (giving an example of a case in 
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ers were quite savvy about deliberative process.  Thomas Jefferson not 
only wrote an important, and still relevant, procedural manual122 but 
believed that legislative procedures were part of the “natural right” of 
self-government.123  Committees were well known at the Founding 
and, without them, we would have no constitution.  In fact, the first 
thing the Founders did was to set the rules of their own convention.124  
The first Congress, sitting in New York in March of 1789 provided a 
set of rules for its own governance, based on those used in the Conti-
nental Congress and various State legislatures.125  As David Currie has 
explained, “Deliberative bodies can scarcely function without proce-
dural rules, and one of the first acts of each House was to adopt 
them.”126  Not surprisingly, the first Congresses adopted rules for 
committees, and even for conference committees “for reconciliation 
and correction of errors.”127 
 
which a judge explicitly resolved a statutory problem by reference to his own experience 
in the legislature). 
122 While he served as Vice President, from 1797 until 1801, Jefferson prepared a manual on 
parliamentary procedure for his own use, as presiding officer of the Senate.  It was an “at-
tempt by its learned author to describe the essentials of the English parliamentary prac-
tice of his time, [and] still forms the basis for the rules of procedure of the American leg-
islature.”  BERNARD SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60 (1955). 
123 He wrote:   
  Every man, and every body of men on earth, possesses the righ[t] of self-government: 
they receive with their being from the hand of nature . . . . [T]he law of the majority is the 
natural law of every society of men.  When a certain description of men are to transact to-
gether a particular business, the times and places of their meeting and separating depend 
on their own will; they make a part of the natural right of self-government.  This, like all 
other natural rights, may be abridged or modified in it’s [sic] exercise, by their own con-
sent, or by the law of those who depute them . . . but so far as it is not abridged or modi-
fied, they retain it as a natural right, and may exercise it in what form they please . . . . 
  17 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 195 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1965) 
(first alteration in the original) (emphasis in original). 
124 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 62, at 8–10. 
(demonstrating the early establishment of the rules of the Convention). 
125 SCHWARTZ, supra note 122, at 60 (citing Galloway). 
126 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, 
at 9 (1997). 
127 Jefferson’s Manual included specific reference both to committees and conference com-
mittees.  See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 56, § XXVII 
(1873) (“Report of Committee” making reference to the existence of a committee); Id. at 
98, § XLVI (“Conferences”); Id. (stating “[i]t is on the occasion of amendments between 
the Houses that conferences are usually asked:  but they may be asked in all cases of dif-
ference of opinion between the two Houses on matters depending between them.”); 
CURRIE, supra note 126, at 10 n.25 (noting that Senator Maclay, at the first Congress, ob-
jected on the grounds that the existence of committees usurped the legislative function.  
Maclay’s argument never persuaded any subsequent Congress for the next 200 years). 
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The earliest Congresses, moreover, kept a journal as the Constitu-
tion requires in the Journal Clause.128  At a minimum, these journals 
revealed congressional procedure.  As Justice Story explained, the 
Journal Clause “insure[s] publicity and responsibility in all the pro-
ceedings of Congress, so that the public mind may be enlightened, as 
to the acts of the members.”129  The treatise writer Sutherland em-
braced legislative journals as “records in dignity and . . . of great im-
portance.”130 As I showed at the beginning of this article, lawyers in 
the Supreme Court cited to legislative journals as early as 1814; the 
Supreme Court Justices did so in statutory and constitutional cases as 
early as 1832; lawyers relied upon committee reports as well as statu-
tory history.131  As Sutherland explained:  “In Blake v. National Banks,132 
the journals of congress were referred to, and the court said they 
were compelled to ascertain the legislative intention in that way.”133  
Whether uniform or not,134 a variety of early state court decisions cit-
 
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, §5, cl.3. (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and 
from time to time publish the same . . . .”).  A legislative “journal” is different from a ver-
batim recording of debate.  A journal sets forth votes, amendments, and dates of consid-
eration.  The early Congress’s journals were more elaborate, however, than mere vote 
counts.   
129 JOSEPH A. STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONTAINING A BRIEF COMMENTARY 92 (1865). 
130 SUTHERLAND, supra note 104, at 46 § 44. 
131 See The Venus, Rae, Master, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 264 (1814) (“Mr. Russell’s statement 
in the report of the committee of congress . . . journal of H. of Rep . . . .”); see also Roach 
v. Commonwealth, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 206, 207 (1793) (citing a progression of statutes as a 
“construction of a Resolve of the General Assembly” on the question of the amount a sol-
dier would have to pay for a uniform).  The journals were referred to in constitutional 
cases as well.  See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 549 (1832) (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The early journals of congress exhibit the most anxious desire to conciliate 
the Indian nations.”); The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 60 (1831) 
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (“The journals of congress, from the year 1775 down to the 
adoption of the present constitution, abundantly demonstrate this fact.”); see id. at 63 
(“[O]n examining the journals of the old congress . . . the terms ‘nation’ and ‘tribe’ are 
frequently used indiscriminately . . . .”); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 681 (8 Pet.) 
(1834) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (referring to journals of the 1783 Congress to deter-
mine that copyright was a common law right). 
132 Blake v. Nat’l Banks, 90 U.S.  (23 Wall.) 307 (1874). 
133 SUTHERLAND, supra note 104, at 384 § 300. 
134 Treatises reflected some disagreement over this question. Compare SUTHERLAND, supra 
note 104, at 384 § 300 (citing several cases for the proposition that legislative journals 
may be used to “aid in the interpretation of doubtful or ambiguous language in the 
law,”contending this was the practice in Illinois, Alabama, and Kentucky, and distinguish-
ing it from reference to “declarations of members of legislative bodies”) with THEODORE 
SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205 (2d ed. 1874) (“[T]he in-
tention of the Legislature is to be found in the statute itself.”) and id. at 218 (the intent is 
to be “learned from the language” and can not be proven by “mere extrinsic facts”), with 
id. at 219 (when there is no other aid to interpretation, “[t]he office of the judge then 
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ed legislative journals as well, some suggesting this was the “clear 
weight” of authority.135 
Journals reveal a bill’s sequential process.  Of course, nineteenth 
century journals were far from today’s congressional record.  The ear-
liest Congresses did not require the journal to be “a verbatim tran-
script of proceedings,”136 even if they did show the sequence of bill 
proceedings.  Over the course of the ninenteenth century, concerns 
were raised both inside and outside of Congress that the reporting of 
its proceedings was not available on a consistent or reliable basis.137  If 
early nineteenth century American courts resorted to legislative his-
tory selectively,138 (and there is mixed historical evidence),139 it may 
 
necessarily changes its character, and he assumes to a certain extent the duties of a legis-
lator . . . [o]f the mode of exercising this power . . . and of its frequent abuse, we shall 
speak more fully . . . .”). 
135 State ex rel. City of Cheyenne v. Swan, 7 Wyo. 166, 209, 213 (1897) (“We cannot but re-
gard the clear weight of authority in this country as sustaining the propriety of consulting 
the journals in reference to a matter which the constitution expressly requires to be rec-
orded therein, concerning the constitutional procedure for the passage of an act . . . .”); 
see State ex rel. Coleman v. Kelly, 71 Kan. 811 450, 453 (1905) (“The respective journals of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, containing the proceedings in reference to a 
bill enacted into a statute, may be looked to by the courts to ascertain the intention of the 
Legislature in enacting such a statute, if it be ambiguous.”); Edger v. Bd. of Com’rs of 
Randolph Cnty., 70 Ind. 331, 338 (1880) (“[F]or the purpose of construction or interpre-
tation, and with the view of ascertaining the legislative will and intention in the enact-
ment of a law, the courts may not properly resort to the journals of the two legislative 
bodies to learn therefrom the history of the law in question . . . .”); Sisk v. Smith, 6 Ill. 
503, 518 (1844) (“In [this] case, the intention of the legislature is manifest, and perpetu-
ated by the record of their proceedings in the legislative journals.”); Hill’s Adm’rs v. 
Mitchell, 5 Ark. 608 (1844) (“In the construction of all doubtful statutes, and even consti-
tutional provisions, the history of the enactment, as furnished by the rolls or journals, is 
the very best evidence as to its meaning and intention.”). 
136 CURRIE, supra note 126, at 10. 
137 See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1891) (discussing the uncertainty surround-
ing the constitutional requirements of denoting congressional majority opinions). 
138 Even an inconsistent historical practice should present no normative objection to those 
inclined toward originalism.  Originalism itself has not been the consistent judicial prac-
tice in constitutional cases in the Supreme Court.  For seventy-five years from the 1880s 
through the 1930s, the Supreme Court engaged in what most scholars agree amounts to 
common law constitutionalism, which is to say that the Supreme Court used common law 
principles to develop judicial doctrines. 
139 As the Supreme Court’s discussion in Mortier makes clear, there is some dispute about the 
earliest uses of matters we might call “legislative history.”  Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. 
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610–12 n.4 (1991); id. at 621–23 (Scalia, J., concurring) (distin-
guishing between the way legislative history was used by Justice Marshall in 1832 from the 
modern use of legislative history “to provide an authoritative interpretation of a statutory 
text”).  As we have seen above, there are very early examples of the use of legislative and 
statutory history by Justices and in state courts.  See supra notes 131 & 135.  See generally  
Eskridge, supra note 21 (describing legislative history as one of a few factors used to aid 
statutory interpretation); Manning, supra note 21 (describing a famous case of legislative 
history being used to interpret ambiguity in a statute). 
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well have resulted from the simple fact that there were no reliable re-
ports of legislative deliberations until the last decades of the nine-
theenth century.140  Even as early as the 1830s, however, the Supreme 
Court referred to lawyers’ arguments about committee reports.141  
Finally, it should be remembered that legislative journals were in-
tended at a minimum to report procedure.  Even if the early journals 
did not report debate fully, there is an ancient precedent revealing 
that legislative law was indeed important to, and recognized by, the 
Framers.  As we have seen, Jefferson decreed the rules necessary to 
the “natural right” of self-government.  Frances Lieber, the great the-
orist of statutory interpretation (and many other things), called the 
rules of any legislative body its “law” essential to legislative “liberty” 
and part of the “common law” of legislative bodies.142  If this is cor-
rect, the committed originalist must consider that there is an ancient, 
common law sanction for “legislative law,” or Congress’s Rules of 
Proceedings.  Put in other words, the originalist cannot dismiss the 
argument for legislative procedure as something invented by modern 
 
140 As early as 1792, Founder Elbridge Gerry called for the recording of congressional de-
bates, not only for the purposes of informing the public, but also the Administration and 
the Judiciary.  Brudney, Shortfalls, supra note 13, at 1219.  Newspaper reporters performed 
this function; they were first permitted entry in 1789 and by 1795 were in both Houses.  
Id. at 1220.   
  By the 1840s, a series of commercial printers employed by Congress had moved toward 
verbatim and nonpartisan accounts of floor discussion, with a congressional requirement 
that legislators receive copies of these published reports.  After 1873, when the Govern-
ment Printing Office began publishing the Congressional Record, there was a complete 
and comprehensive method for recording congressional proceedings and debates. 
    Id. at 1221–22; see also id. at 1222–23 (“[B]y the time of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
Congress had ordered daily publication and delivery of full chamber proceedings to all 
members, and distribution of committee reports to members had become prevalent.”). 
141 See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524 (1838) ("The petition refers to the reports of the 
judiciary committee of the senate, of January 20th 1837, and February 17th, 1837, and to 
the correspondence between the postmaster general and the chairman of the committee 
copies of which are annexed to the petition.").   
142 LIEBER, supra note 24.  The development of parliamentary practice, or rules of proceed-
ing and debate—such as it has been developed by England, independently of the execu-
tive, and like the rest of the common law, been carried over to our soil—form a most es-
sential part of our Anglican constitutional, parliamentary liberty.  See id. (“Of far greater 
importance is the body of the rules of procedure and that usage which has gradually 
grown up as a part of common law, by which the dispatch of parliamentary business and 
its protection against impassioned hurry are secured, and by which the order and free-
dom of debate, fairness, and an organic gestation of the laws are intended to be ob-
tained.”); see also id. at 516 (outlining how the Constitution of the United States says that 
“[e]ach house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disor-
derly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member,” but if, howev-
er, the parliamentary practice had not already been spread over the colonies, like the 
common law itself, this power, justly and necessarily conferred on each house, would have 
been of comparatively little advantage.). 
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legislatures, but must consider the ancient American common law of 
parliamentary procedure.  Certainly there is no comparable history 
suggesting that the Bicameralism Clause has been lurking in the 
background as a constitutional challenge either to learning Con-
gress’s rules or using them to understand legislative context. 
III.  THE NON-DELEGATION ARGUMENT 
Some constitutionalists have recognized that the bicameralism ar-
gument is implausible or at least overbroad143:  if taken to its logical 
extreme it appears to make the courts’ own interpretive materials un-
constitutional since canons and prior cases and common law are not 
“passed” by both houses.  Legislative history critics reply that there is 
a way to resolve that matter by referring to non-delegation doctrine.144  
Assume a statutory gap:  Congress may delegate to an agency or a 
court the ability to fill that gap but it cannot delegate this power to 
itself, to its own bill sponsors, or committees.145  As John Manning has 
explained: 
It is the very fact of congressional involvement in the creation of legislative histo-
ry that justifies textualists’ rejection of such materials.  When a court assigns 
legislative history decisive weight because of the speaker’s status, it permits a 
committee or sponsor to interpret a law on Congress’s behalf.  This practice 
effectively assigns legislative agents the law elaboration function—the power 
to ‘say what the law is.’146 
It is certainly true that Congress would risk violating the Constitu-
tion if it were to delegate de jure lawmaking to its subparts.  If, for ex-
ample, Congress passed a law saying that Arizona, or the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, could decide the nation’s immigration 
 
143 Professor Manning himself argues that there are problems with the bicameralism claim 
since agency regulations and court cases are extrinsic evidence that are used by courts but 
do not satisfy the bicameralism clause.  See Manning, supra note 4, at 695; accord, Siegel, 
supra note 13, at 1459-60 (discussing Manning's argument on bicameralism). 
144 Manning, supra note 4, at 675 (“[T]extualism should be understood as a means of im-
plementing a central and increasingly well-settled element of the separation of powers—
the prohibition against legislative self-delegation.”). 
145 See Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgement) (“But assuming Justice Stevens is right about this desire to 
leave details to the committees, the very first provision of the Constitution forbids it.  Ar-
ticle I, § 1 provides that ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representa-
tives.’ . . . No one would think that the House of Representatives could operate in such 
fashion that only the broad outlines of bills would be adopted by vote of the full House, 
leaving minor details to be written, adopted, and voted upon only by cognizant commit-
tees.”). 
146 Manning, supra note 4 at 706 (emphasis added). 
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policy, that action would most certainly be unconstitutional.  In fact, 
it would undermine individuals’ and states’ most fundamental right 
to be represented.  Vast portions of the Constitution deal with repre-
sentation, and the representational clauses147 caution against such a 
delegation.  In fact, the Supreme Court has, in INS v. Chadha,148 re-
jected such delegations. 
Legislative history skeptics concede, however, that such a de jure 
delegation is not at stake in the legislative history debate.149  The ar-
gument is subtler:  critics claim that legislative history exacerbates 
Congress’s tendency to control the interpretive game.  Self-
delegation breeds a conflict of interest.  The self-part of the self-
delegation poses the problem.  “[L]egislative history is endogenous to 
the legislative process,”150 and this distinguishes it from delegation by 
Congress to agencies or courts.  “Although neither a pre-enactment 
Supreme Court case nor a committee report formally goes through 
bicameralism and presentment, crediting a legislatively created 
source of meaning offers Congress a more substantial temptation to 
shift the specification of detail outside the legislative process.”151 
A.  Section 5:  A Constitutional License for Delegation 
On its surface, this argument cannot supplant the clear import of 
the Rulemaking Clause.  That clause amounts to a constitutional license 
for Congressional self-delegation.  Indeed, to the extent the Constitu-
tion gives each house the power to decide their own rules, it performs 
delegation—it delegates to a part of Congress (“each House”) what 
might otherwise require bicameralism (that all rules would have to be 
passed by both Houses and submitted to the President).  It is simply 
not accurate to say, as a matter of constitutional text, that “the” legisla-
tive power under Article I cannot be delegated if in fact Article I, Sec-
tion 5 delegates power to a part of the Congress to create its own 
rules and procedures.152 
 
147 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 & 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (authorizing the 
people to vote for the House and Senate); id. art. II, § 1, cls. 2–3, amended by U.S. Const. 
amend. XII (authorizing the people to vote for a President and Vice President through 
an electoral college).  For an explanation of these provisions, see infra Part IV.C. 
148 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
149 Manning, supra note 4, at 683 (“[T]he Court . . . did not purport to give the relevant 
committee report the status of legislation de jure.”) 
150 Id. at 707. 
151 Id. 
152 One might argue that the “legislative” power in the vesting clause is limited to the full 
Congress.  But even if we say that the “rules and proceedings” power is not “legislative” 
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In fact, courts have gone so far as to suggest that the Rulemaking 
Clause authorizes self-delegation: that Congress will be the judge of its 
own rules, short of a constitutional rights violation.153  This clause 
simply reflects what the Constitution’s text makes clear in a number 
of cases:  the departments created by our Constitution are not free of 
conflict of interest.  For example, Congress may set its own rules; and 
the courts may create prudential limits on their jurisdiction.154  Pre-
sumably, if one wanted to have a viable check against Congress or the 
judiciary abusing these privileges, then one would set up a check 
against such practices.  In fact, there are good reasons to believe just 
the opposite about the Constitution–that in some cases, departments 
are the judges in their own cause.  This, after all, is the claim of uni-
tary executivists who argue that the President has the right to remove 
his subordinates, for any and all reasons.  If self-delegation is appro-
priate there, why not in the case of Congress?155 
More importantly, the self-delegation argument should fail be-
cause it does not in fact distinguish legislative history from other 
forms of interpretive tools used by judges or administrators.  Let us 
assume that Congress does have a conflict of interest when it comes 
to legislative history.  On what ground does this distinguish legislators 
from judges or members of the executive branch?  When executive 
agents rely upon their own interpretation of rules, they have a con-
flict of interest, and they have an incentive as well to push their au-
thority to its limits.  When judges rely upon their own canons or 
common law, they have a conflict of interest.  Departments tend to 
rely upon the materials they themselves produce and this applies 
whether the department is legislative, executive, or judicial.156 
 
power in this sense, it is still a power to do something, and it is still delegated to a part of 
Congress. 
153 See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (describing how the Constitution al-
lows each House of Congress to determine its own rules). 
154 See BICKEL, supra note 36, at 111-98.   
155 I use this particular example because Justice Scalia is widely believed to be a supporter of 
both the unitary executivist position, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-32 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), and the position that Congress may not self-delegate.  See isupra 
note 145. 
156 There is nothing in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), that supports this position.   But 
see Manning, supra note 4, at 717, that is contrary.  Bowsher was correctly decided for the 
same reasons that Justice Scalia’s dissent in the independent counsel case, Morrison v. Ol-
son, is correct.  487 U.S. at 725–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Bowsher involved the delegation 
to an independent agent the power to set the American budget.  For an analysis of Bow-
sher, see Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 793–95 (1999) 
(discussing that Bowsher struck down an act that mixed executive and legislative powers).  
Bowsher in this sense argues for, not against, Congress’s procedures. 
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Ultimately, the conflict of interest argument is less a constitutional 
argument than a pragmatic one:  the argument is that if courts use 
“legislative history,” Congress will have a greater incentive to put ma-
terials in legislative history rather than text.  The empirical assump-
tion here—that Congress actually creates legislative history in re-
sponse to what courts say about interpretive rules—is belied by what 
we know about Congress and most collective bodies.  Whatever rules 
courts create, Congress will continue to create legislative history, just 
as any corporation delegates and creates records of its delegations.157  
Every empirical study to date, the most recent being the comprehen-
sive Gluck-Bressman study,158 supports the claim that Congress’s pro-
cedures have little to do with courts; they are created to allow a large 
group of 535 to manage its business. 
B.  Misunderstanding Congressional Process 
But even if this were not true, the nondelegation argument re-
mains both overinclusive, indicting other kinds of lawmaking action, 
and underinclusive, saying nothing about conflicting texts.  The 
claim is that if Congress puts material in legislative history it is evad-
ing the Bicameralism Clause, so that this practice increases the likeli-
hood of constitutional violations.  This form of the bicameralism ar-
gument is no better than the more overt one we have seen before.  It 
is overbroad because it applies as well to agencies:  they too have an 
incentive to evade bicameralism by writing rules and regulations, and 
no constitutionalist believes agency rules are unconstitutional be-
cause of the Bicameralism Clause.  More importantly, it does nothing 
to solve the problem of conflicting legislative texts—these texts have 
all passed the bicameral process.  The only argument that could be 
made is against recourse to Congress’s sequential process to resolve 
textual conflicts, an argument belied by the Rulemaking Clause. 
In the end, the nondelegation argument simply misunderstands 
congressional process—indeed, it imagines a process that does not 
exist.  The delegation argument posits, in essence, that Congress 
passes a bill and then delegates to a committee to interpret that bill.  
In fact, as Jonathan Siegel long ago explained, this has Congress in 
 
157 THOMAS CONYNGTON ET AL., CORPORATION PROCEDURE:  LAW, FINANCE, ACCOUNTING 245 
(Hugh R. Conyngton ed., 1922) (discussing the “[p]ower of the Board to Delegate Au-
thority to Committees”); id. at 250–51 (“[M]inutes should be kept containing a faithful 
record of all committee proceedings.”). 
158 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 60 (affirming original findings of Nourse and Schacter on 
the question whether Congress is capable of not using legislative history). 
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reverse.159  There is a reason that the whole body reviews the work of 
committees:  to check their excesses.  A bill that will not pass the ma-
jority will fail the Rules Committee in the House and will be ignored 
by the Majority leader in the Senate.  Floor time is scarce.160  The pro-
cess moves forward from a committee report to a final product, not in 
reverse from a final report to a committee review.  The proper analo-
gy here would be the review of a statute by the judiciary, and certainly 
textualists cannot be claiming that judicial construction of a statute 
violates the bicameralism clause or amounts to an improper delega-
tion.161  Finally, the nondelegation argument runs up against textual-
ists’ avowed affection for the common law.  Since this country’s be-
ginning, legislative rules have been considered a form of “common 
law.” 162  As the great early theorist of statutory interpretation, Frances 
Lieber, made clear, the rules of any legislative body amount to its 
“law.” 163   The rules governing Parliament were called parliamentary 
law and considered part of the “common law” of legislation. 164   In 
fact, Lieber wrote eloquently about legislative procedure, deeming it 
essential to Anglo-American “liberty”: 
Parliamentary practice, or rules of proceeding and debate, such as it 
has been developed by England, independently of the executive, and like 
the rest of the common law, been carried over to our soil, form a most 
essential part of our Anglican constitutional, parliamentary liberty.165 
 
159 See Siegel, supra note 13, at 1479 ("For a statute's interpretation to be influenced by texts 
that existed prior to the statute's adoption cannot violate the rule against self-delegation, 
because it does not involve delegation at all.  The concept of delegation of power is in-
herently forward-looking; it involves the granting of power to act in the future.") 
160 Michael Doran, The Closed Rule, 59 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1383 (2010) (“[F]loor time in the 
House is a scarce resource . . . .”). 
161 It is precisely for this reason that Professor Manning is at some pains to distinguish con-
gressional self-delegation from delegation to agencies and the judiciary.  See Manning, su-
pra note 4, at 695–705. 
162 See 59 AM. JUR.2D Parliamentary Law §§ 9, 14 (2014) (describing as “common law” rules of 
proceedings such as the quorum rule and motion and amendment practice); see also Saul 
Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decision Making, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 
971, 976–77 (1989)(tracing the customary evolution of “parliamentary law” from English 
parliamentary procedure, alteration by colonial legislatures, to Jefferson’s Manual of Par-
liamentary Practice). 
163 See LIEBER, supra note 24 (“Of far greater importance is the body of the rules of proce-
dure and that usage which has gradually grown up as part of common law, by which the 
dispatch of parliamentary business and its protection against impassioned hurry are se-
cured and by which the order and freedom of debate, fairness, and an organic gestation 
of the laws, are intended to be obtained.”). 
164 Id.   
165 LIEBER, supra note 24, at 188–89. 
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IV.  THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
It is time to turn from text to larger constitutional principles, 
namely the separation of powers.  If there is a legal basis to the claim 
against a conflict of interest it is a form of argument about the “sepa-
ration of powers.”  Some scholars have asserted, for example, that 
conflict of interest principles drive the separation of powers.166  This is 
not the only form of separation of powers argument made by critics 
of legislative history:  some have argued that recourse to legislative 
history lies outside the “judicial power”;167 others that there is a mis-
match of function implicit in a Congress that both passes and inter-
prets text.168  There are, however, substantial questions about the as-
sumptions underlying the “checking” principle and the functional 
mismatch principle.  Neither describes the constitution’s text nor 
what matters for our system of separated powers.169 
The Constitution itself provides no functional purity in the de-
partments.  For example, the President’s veto power exists not in Ar-
ticle II, governing the Executive power, but in Article I, governing the 
legislative power, a functional mismatch mirrored by others.170  The 
Constitution does provide quite clearly that the departments are cre-
ated by different forms of the “electoral connection” or representa-
 
166 For the seminal work making this association, see Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the 
Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 309 (1989) (discussing 
the rationale for the separation of powers, which prevents a judge from acting “in its own 
cause”).  Modern scholars have simply taken this for granted.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, 
Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1015 (2006) (associating 
the separation of powers with “conflicts of interest”). 
167 Eskridge, supra note 21; Manning, supra note 21. 
168 See Manning, supra note 4, at 706 (arguing that judicial reference to legislative history 
“effectively assigns legislative agents the law elaboration function . . .”) (emphasis added); id. 
at 707–31 (arguing that the separation of powers separates the “lawmaking” and law 
“elaboration” functions). 
169 Nourse, supra note 22, at 470–71 (1996); see also Nourse, supra note 156, at 793–95 (1999-
2000) (discussing the vertical nature of the separation of powers, requiring one to look 
“not only where power goes to, but also where it comes from”); see generally Victoria 
Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835 (2004) [hereinafter 
Nourse, Anatomy] (discussing the effects that the separation of powers has had on federal-
ism); Victoria Nourse & John Figura, Toward a Representational Theory of Executive Power, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 273 (2011) (differentiating between formalist separation of powers and func-
tionalist separation of powers). 
170 For example, the veto power, which one would expect to find in Article II governing the 
President, is instead located in Article I.  So, too, Congress’s power to create inferior 
courts does not appear in Congress’s Article I, but in Article III.  The Senate’s power to 
conduct a trial in cases of impeachment does not exist in Article III involving the judici-
ary, but instead in Article I. 
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tive constituencies.171  Moving power moves constituency.  When pow-
er is shifted away from the Congress toward a court, the shift raises 
questions about moving from a body with strong representative con-
stituency and local ties (the House and Senate) to a body that has no 
constituency (courts).  Judical power is the only power to decide un-
fettered by constituency.  The question in the legislative history de-
bate is whether using legislative history risks too great a severance of 
ties to the electorate; put in more colloquial terms, the question is 
whether courts aggrandize or undermine central constituency rela-
tionships when they use legislative history. 
A.  The Inadequacy of Checking and Conflict of Interest Theory 
One way to rehabilitate the non-delegation argument is to re-
phrase it as a separation of powers claim.  There is a long tradition in 
the separation of powers relying upon the principle that “no man 
may be a judge in his own cause.”172  Some scholars have urged that 
this principle drives the separation of powers.173  Under this theory, 
Congress has a conflict of interest in creating legislative history, one 
that only the court can “check.” 
One rather serious problem with the “checking” theory on which 
this claim is based is that it cannot explain the Constitution we have: 
it may explain the need to separate powers, but it is not sufficient to 
explain our Constitution.174  The term “checks and balances” sums up 
this most common, but misleading, ideal of the separation of powers.  
The idea is simple enough:  when one department exceeds its pow-
ers, a rival department will use its specified constitutional authority to 
bring the first department back into line.  In this sense, the paradig-
matic checking power is the presidential veto, which allows the exec-
utive to reject, and thus restrain, excess legislative zeal.  Although 
common, this vision has proved troubling:  if pushed, it seems either 
to swallow or to erase the idea of separation.  If checks do the work of 
 
171 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3 (establishing the process by which members of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate are elected); U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cls.2–3 & amend. XII 
(creating the process by which Presidents are elected); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (provid-
ing for direct election of Senators). 
172 See Nourse, Federalist Papers supra note 22, at 470–71 (discussing The Federalist Nos. 49 
and 50 as proposals aimed at dealing with the issue of individual branches of government 
judging the constitutionality of their own actions). 
173 See, e.g., articles cited supra note 166. 
174 See generally Nourse, supra note 156; Nourse, Anatomy supra note 168. 
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separation, then what independent purpose does the ideal of separa-
tion serve?175  Perhaps we simply have a government of “checks.”176 
Despite the prevalence of the “checks” interpretation, the Framers 
knew that checks were only as good as the structural incentives to use 
them.  So-called “checking powers” offer us no protection—indeed 
they may even encourage departmental collapse—if those who wield 
them have a personal incentive to undermine separate institutional 
identities.177  At best, checks represent a necessary, rather than a suffi-
cient, description of the Madisonian separation of powers.  In Federal-
ist No. 48, Madison reminds us that, despite all precautions, including 
express separation of powers clauses,178 the state legislatures had 
made substantial encroachments on executive power.  In Virginia, 
the “judiciary and the executive members were left dependent on the 
legislature for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their 
continuance in it.”179  The danger had not been created by the delin-
eation of power on paper; the danger was created because those in 
power had no personal incentive to maintain separation.  If the legis-
lature were to assume “executive and judiciary powers, no opposition 
is likely to be made . . . .”180  Checks in the hands of a “dependent” 
executive or judiciary were of no use because they would not be 
used.181 
Indeed, checks may become tools to undermine the separation of 
powers.  During the Constitutional Convention, Madison and others 
voiced considerable fear that the presidential veto, for example, 
would not be used and that disuse might lead to usurpations by the 
 
175 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. 
REV. 225, 232 (noting that modern views on the separation of powers become “indistin-
guishable from a free-floating checks and balances” theory). 
176 See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 123, 177–79 (1994) (arguing that the checking function is the essential “principle” 
of the separation of powers). 
177 See supra text accompanying notes 149–51. 
178 A specific “separation of powers” clause was inserted in some colonial constitutions, in-
cluding that of Virginia.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 247 (James Madison) (Lawrence 
Goldman ed., 2008) (discussing Virginia’s emphasis on the importance of the separation 
of powers). 
179 Id. at 248 (quoting Thomas Jefferson). 
180 Id. at 248 (quoting Thomas Jefferson). 
181 A similar argument appears in The Federalist Nos. 49 and 50, in which Madison warns 
that any proposal to decide constitutional breaches would be distorted if left to those who 
have an “interest” in the outcome.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 251–53 (James Madison) 
(Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008); THE FEDERALIST NO. 50, at 254–55 (James Madison) 
(Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008).  See also Nourse, supra note 22, at 470–71 (discussing 
Madison’s rejection of Thomas Jefferson’s proposals because he feared they posed “the 
risk that constitutional structure [would] be determined by private, not public, interest”). 
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legislature.182  Others feared that it could be abused:  Dr. Benjamin 
Franklin explained that “[h]e had had some experience of this check 
in the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary Govern-
ment of [Pennsylvania where t]he negative of the Governor was con-
stantly made use of to extort money.”183  According to Franklin: 
No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with 
him.  An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a 
condition [of the veto]; till at last it became the regular practice, to have 
orders in his favor on the Treasury, presented along with the bills to be 
signed . . . .184 
History, ancient and modern, cautions that “adding” checks to 
avoid conflicts of interest can turn out rather badly.  Consider the 
Tenure of Office Act, passed after the Civil War to permit the Senate 
to “check” President Andrew Johnson’s efforts to remove pro-
Lincoln, pro-Reconstruction executive officers. 185  The Act certainly 
“checked” the President, but proved disastrous.  Ultimately deemed 
unconstitutional, it led to the nation’s first presidential impeach-
ment.186  Or consider the Independent Counsel law, a new “check” if 
there ever was one, which again turned out rather badly—
impeaching a President over radically inappropriate personal mis-
conduct many believed irrelevant to the running of the country and 
leading to a bipartisan consensus against reauthorizing the law. 187  In 
short, conflict of interest is an important principle, but insufficient to 
describe our Constitution, nor one that justifies blithely “adding” 
checks to the Constitution. 
 
182 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 62, at 107 (statement of 
James Madison of Virginia, June 4, 1787) (questioning whether the veto power would be 
used “because no man will dare exercise it wh[e]n[] the law was passed almost unani-
mously”). 
183 Id. at 99 (statement of Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, June 4, 1787). 
184 Id. 
185 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 181-83 (2008). 
186 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (declaring the Tenure of Office Act 
invalid “in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive offic-
ers who had been appointed by him”); Nourse & Figura, supra note 169, at 299 (discuss-
ing this episode in history). 
187 See Nourse, supra note 156, at 774–77 (discussing the balance of power issues created by 
the Independent Counsel statute); Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment 
and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L. J. 2193, 2195 (1998) (same); see also Nourse 
& Figura, supra note 169, at 287 (2011) (explaining that the independent counsel law 
"died an easy congressional death"). 
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B.  Functional Understandings Run Amok 
If checking theory is not sufficient to reject judicial reliance on 
legislative history, nor are claims based on the separation of powers 
reconceived in functional terms.  When it comes to legislative history, 
there are two identifiable claims based on overt functional analysis:  
first, there is the claim that the “judicial power” cognizes only refer-
ence to the text, not legislative history;188 second, there is the claim 
that there is a functional mismatch between congressional “lawmak-
ing” and “interpretation.” 189  As a matter of theory, these claims suffer 
from a major problem:  the schoolboy view of the separation of pow-
ers as a separation of functions is incomplete.  The Constitution itself 
does not provide for functional separation.190  If this is correct, then it 
is surely unwise to move up a level of generality to try to find a separa-
tion of generalized functions in some sort of idealized, and non-
textual, vision of functional purity.191 
Even if we assume that functional purity can in fact play a role in 
separation of powers analysis, there is no clear answer offered by 
functional analysis in the case of legislative history.  For example, 
there has been a great debate about the history of the nature of “ju-
dicial power”; textualists arguing that, in America, text prevailed at 
the turn of the 19th century, while their opponents arguing that “judi-
cial power” included such English doctrines as “the equity of the stat-
ute,” allowing courts considerable power to deviate from the text.192  
 
188 Cf. Eskridge, supra note 21, at 991–92 (critiquing claims by textualists that the use of legis-
lative history is outside the boundaries of the “judicial power” as originally understood); 
Manning, supra note 21, at 9, 57–58 (arguing that the Constitution intended to “draw 
sharp lines” between legislative and judicial functions, thereby limiting the “judicial pow-
er” to considerations within the enacted text and not such outside considerations as “the 
equity” of the statute). 
189 Manning, supra note 4, at 706–07. 
190 For example, the veto power, which one would expect to find in Article II governing the 
President, is instead found in Article I.  So, too, Congress’s power to create inferior courts 
does not appear in Congress’s Article I, but in Article III.  The Senate’s power to conduct 
a trial in cases of impeachment does not exist in Article III involving the judiciary, but in-
stead in Article I.  There are other examples.  See Nourse & Figura, supra note 169, at 291 
(discussing these and other examples, such as the fact that the “power of the Chief Justice 
to preside over a presidential impeachment appears in Article I and not Article III, with 
other ‘judicial’ powers”). 
191 The leading textualist in the academy recognizes that there are serious problems with 
imagining that the separation of powers has a specific textual pedigree.  See John F. Man-
ning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1945 (2011) 
(“Because the structural provisions come in many shapes and sizes, no one-size-fits-all 
theory can do them justice.”). 
192 Compare Manning, Divides, supra note 7, at 108 n.137 (arguing against a broad historical 
understanding of “judicial power” that would include considerations extrinsic to the stat-
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There are decent arguments on both sides of the historical claim and, 
until further evidence is unearthed, we must be satisfied with the an-
swer that the historical record is mixed.193  No one who reads Black-
stone, the leading legal authority in America at the Founding, can 
possibly believe that text was not of primary importance.  On the oth-
er hand, Blackstone also openly embraced the “reason and spirit” of 
the law, yes “spirit”—a term that textualists view with “antipathy” as a 
basis for statutory interpretation.194 
There are more subtle functional, but equally unsatisfying, de-
bates enmeshed in constitutional arguments against the use of legisla-
tive history.  Some complain that it is not the job of the legislature to 
“say what the law is,”195 an obvious reference to Marbury v. Madison,196 
but surely this cannot mean what it says:  legislatures’ job is in fact to 
say what the law is, quite literally, to make law.  A narrower, and more 
specified claim, is that legislatures are aggrandizing their authority by 
asserting what amounts to a “judicial” or “interpretive” function.  If 
legislative history is authoritative (if courts use it to fill gaps), Con-
gress will have an incentive to put more of its work in legislative histo-
ry, rather than the text, aggrandizing the legislative function.197  Note 
that both of these claims “saying what the law is” and “aggrandizing 
the interpretive function” depend upon implicit visions of a proper 
functional division between courts and Congress—that courts are “in-
terpreters” (a term that is nowhere in the Constitution) and Congress 
is not. 
 
utory text), with Eskridge, Jr., supra note 21, at 995–96 (arguing that, historically, “judicial 
power” included the power to go beyond the “words of the statute and the letter of the 
law,” and incorporated discretionary interpretive techniques derived from English com-
mon law tradition). 
193 I am currently in the process of compiling a large database on founding statutory inter-
pretation.  See Eskridge, supra note 21, at 995–96; Manning, Divides, supra note 7, at 108 
n.137 (demonstrating the conflicting accounts). 
194 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61 (“[T]he most universal and effectual way of 
discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the 
reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it.”).  But see Man-
ning, supra note 71, at 425 (“I will focus my attention on the textualists’ antipathy towards 
sacrificing the letter of the law to its spirit . . . .”). 
195 See Manning, supra note 4, at 706 (arguing that a court’s practice of giving weight to legis-
lative history in statutory interpretation allows legislative agents to “say what the law is,” a 
function traditionally reserved for the judiciary). 
196 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is.”). 
197 See Manning, supra note 4, at 706 (“If . . . Congress can effectively delegate law elabora-
tion authority to its own committees or members, th[e] structural incentive [to resolve 
important issues in the enacted text] is substantially undermined . . . .”). 
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Such claims are likely to be most persuasive to those who have al-
ready attached themselves to a position in the grand debates for or 
against legislative history.  The functional terms are simply too slip-
pery, too general, to build a convincing constitutional argument.  Yes, 
courts interpret law, but so does Congress.  Indeed, courts keep tell-
ing Congress that it should know more law.198  And, then, of course, 
we return to our bicameralism problem:  if Congress interprets law, 
so does the President.  Is all legal interpretation done by the execu-
tive branch now unconstitutional because it should be done by the 
courts?  Functionalism, express or implied, cannot supply a firm 
ground on which to base an argument against legislative history for 
much the same reasons the bicameralism argument fails:  both are 
wildly over-generalized and for that reason fail to distinguish legisla-
tive history from precisely analogous actions in the judicial and exec-
utive branches. 
In its best light, the functional argument turns out to be a com-
plaint against abusive forms of legislative history, not all legislative 
history.  In some cases, legislatures pass laws and then attempt to tell 
courts how to interpret laws contrary to the agreed upon text.  The 
post-enactment colloquy is a “legislative history” outlier in terms of 
legislative process, but is the prototypical example of this com-
plaint.199  Consider the legislative history used and abused in the case 
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.200  The issue was whether the Defense Author-
izations Act stripped the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over all pend-
ing habeas cases including Hamdan’s case. 201  The author of an early 
 
198 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694–703 (1979) (presuming Congres-
sional knowledge of existing law and judicial interpretations in construing ambiguous 
provision of Title IX); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (presuming 
Congressional knowledge of the universal notion that intent is a necessary element of a 
crime in construing criminal statute where Congress did not explicitly mention intent); 
Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (presuming 
Congressional knowledge of existing law and judicial interpretations in construing am-
biguous provisions of Title II and Section 504 where Congress enacted preexisting reme-
dial scheme without change); United States v. Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. 
(PATCO), 653 F.2d 1134, 1138 (7th Cir. 1981) (presuming Congressional knowledge of 
existing law and judicial interpretations in construing text of Title VII where Congress 
codified the language of a previously construed provision without change). 
199 See Manning, supra note 4, at 688 (arguing that if courts recognize legislative history, 
“‘legislators [will] be encouraged to salt the legislative record with unilateral interpreta-
tions of statutory provisions they were unable to persuade their colleagues to accept’” 
(quoting Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 717 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring))). 
200 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 667 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“These statements 
were made when Members of Congress were fully aware that our continuing jurisdiction 
over this very case was at issue.”). 
201 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 574. 
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disputed amendment engaged in a faked colloquy, written to appear 
as if it were given “live,” but only after the bill had passed.202  And, in this 
particular case, although the law was framed generally, it was widely 
known in Congress and elsewhere, that it was directed at stripping ju-
risdiction from the Supreme Court in Hamdan’s own case.203 
Courts are perfectly free to ignore such legislative history if they 
find, as they rightly should, that such colloquies have as their sole 
purpose the attempt to influence interpretation in particular cases.  
No member of Congress (who are most savvy about these kinds of 
abuse) would believe that this was the meaning of the bill, so why 
should courts?  Congress would violate the separation of powers, in 
my view, if it were to take on the task of litigating individual cases.  In 
Chadha, the Supreme Court at least implicitly recognized this prob-
lem.204  No one really believes that Congress should judge individual 
cases because its incentives to represent majorities’ fleeting prejudic-
es are likely to oppress individuals and minorities.  Indeed, as the his-
tory of the Alien and Sedition Acts shows, Congress’s electoral con-
nection, once applied to individual cases, becomes the power to put 
one’s political enemies in jail.205 
To concede that Congress should not judge individual cases, and 
that legislative history can be abused is not to say that all legislative 
history is constitutionally suspect.  In Hamdan, there is no question 
but that the Court should have rejected the post-passage attempt to 
revise the meaning of the text of the bill.  A decision process ap-
proach in that case would have relied upon the amendment’s text 
and changes to the text as conclusive.206  That there are abuses of any 
 
202 See id. at 580 n.10 (discussing statements made by Senators Kyl and Graham).  Justice 
Scalia argued that these statements were “delivered (like Demosthenes’ practice sessions 
on the beach) alone into a vast emptiness.”  Id. at 666 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In fact, 
ninety-three Senators were on the floor for the passage of the Conference Committee 
Report, where the statements were alleged to be made.  Of course, the statements of Kyl 
and Graham, and others, were not made “live.”  My thanks to Daniel Michelson-Horowitz, 
Georgetown class of 2012, for discovering the attendance figures. 
203 See id. at 667 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“These statements were made when Members of Con-
gress were fully aware that our continuing jurisdiction over this very case was at issue.”). 
204 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[T]he separation-of-powers doctrine generally, reflect[s] the Framers’ concern that trial 
by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of power.”). 
205 See Victoria F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 
1698 n.30 (2003) (describing the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts as “an attempt by 
some of the ‘founders’ to use the criminal law to punish members of the dissenting par-
ty”). 
206 The original amendment’s text would have stripped jurisdiction; the amendment 
changed the original bill’s effect upon pending cases.  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 578–80 
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power does not mean that the power does not exist.  Nor can such a 
case mean that judges can confidently claim that the separation of 
powers bars recourse to all legislative history and process. 
C.  Applying Representational Theory 
One of the great mistakes of those who seek to understand our 
Constitution’s structure is their failure to recognize that its structure 
is not like an architecture, which is static, nor is it like a poem whose 
words may be parsed, but that it is a powerful engine, run by textual 
principles that  unleash power.  By this I mean that it is a mistake to 
think that one can understand the separation of powers by a few de-
scriptive phrases, like executive, legislative, and judicial, which is the 
standard way of understanding constitutional structure.  The Consti-
tution is a blueprint for an engine, the engine of representation.  
Representation drives separation, because it creates incentives for 
those in office—“the man,” as James Madison put it in Federalist No. 
51—to “identify with the constitutional interests of the place.”207 
If we want to understand the structure of the Constitution or the 
power of the branches, the most important words in the Constitution 
are not those in the Vesting Clauses or even the words “executive,” 
“legislative,” or “judicial;” they are the words that create government 
by consent of the governed—that create representation.  Indeed, 
most of Articles I and II are devoted to creating relationships of gov-
erned to governing.  Article I authorizes people to vote for a House 
of Representatives and a Senate in lengthy provisions specifying who 
shall vote for whom.208  Article II authorizes the people to vote for a 
President, through the Electoral College, again specified in rather 
lengthy detail.209  Those elected in this way in turn must agree to ap-
point executive officers and Supreme Court Justices.210  These are 
central constitutional doings that quite literally “constitute” our gov-
ernment. 
 
(noting Congress’s rejection of an earlier proposed amendment which would have made 
the jurisdictional directive apply to pending cases as well). 
207 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 96, at 257.  Some have doubted this identification 
works as well as it might in practice to safeguard all sorts of constitutional provisions.  See 
LEVINSON, supra note 41.  But for our purposes here, the claim is only that it provides 
those inside the departments with an incentive to identify relatively more with their de-
partment as opposed to others. 
208 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (articulating the pro-
cess by which the House of Representative Members and Senators shall be elected). 
209 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cls. 2–3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII (articulating the 
process by which the President shall be elected). 
210 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (articulating the President’s appointment powers). 
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One can appreciate the importance of the Constitution’s repre-
sentational provisions by conducting an intellectual experiment.  
Strike the first sentences of the Vesting Clauses, eliminating any ref-
erence to “executive” or “legislative” or “judicial” powers.  Will the 
government be without power?  Will the President stop issuing execu-
tive orders?  Will Congress stop making laws?  Will the judiciary shut 
its doors?  No.  People will still vote, Congress will still convene, the 
Supreme Court will still issue opinions, and the President will still di-
rect his administration.  Now strike the clauses in Article I providing 
for representation and voting; strike the same clauses in Article II, in-
cluding those that provide for the appointment of Supreme Court 
Justices.  Now we have no government.  It is the representational and 
appointment provisions, not the Vesting Clauses,211 that are the most 
important in our Constitution. 
Of course this is not the standard story of the separation of pow-
ers, but it is one that holds up under intellectual experimentation.  
Ask a lawyer to take out a pen and paper and to write down some-
thing about the separation of powers.  No doubt she will write down 
something resembling the Vesting Clauses or a list of governmental 
functions, emphasizing the executive, legislative, and judicial.  But 
think about that for a moment.  Nothing in that list will actually cre-
ate a working government—there will be no one running it, no one 
voting for it, and no one representing anyone else.  How then can the 
Vesting Clauses or functional descriptions be as important as they are 
so often claimed to be? 
Thankfully, history bears out the representational approach.  The 
Constitution was not a theoretical project.  The new Constitution was 
not simply a description of a government; it created that government.  
The Articles of Confederation had failed to produce a working gov-
ernment–there was no executive to execute the laws, there was no 
way to corral the states into paying their debts, and the Articles’ rule 
of unanimity had made it impossible to govern.  Readers of the de-
bates of the constitutional convention or the ratification conventions 
are maddened by the fact that questions of great moment today, such 
as the reach of powers of war and commerce, were never defined.  
The Framers were not drawing an engine for a court, they were not 
 
211 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Con-
gress of the United States . . . .”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
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describing it; they were building the machine as a blueprint, a plan, 
for future action. 
The real stakes in the separation of powers battle are about which 
kind of representatives will gain power and lose power when we 
change the status quo, and what kind of incentives these representa-
tives have under the Constitution.  This analysis first requires us to 
translate what we instinctively call “function” into “representation.”  
For example, executive power means as a general rule the power of a 
national constituency; similarly, Congress represents state and local 
constituencies; finally, the Courts represent no constituency.  Next, it 
requires that this representational view of power should be analyzed 
in terms of a transfer from an existing baseline practice, the status 
quo.  The proper question is how a shift in power-as-representation 
shifts key decisionmakers. 
Consider a simple example in which the status quo gives the pow-
er of removing principal officers to the President.  Step one translates 
that to a national constituency.  Step two asks how that constituency 
changes when we shift power.  Assume that the proposed shift moves 
power away from the President to the Senate, as in the much-reviled 
Tenure of Office Act.  Shifiting power from the President to Congress 
shifts power from a national to a state and local constitutency.  Shift-
ing power to the Senate more particularly empowers representation 
based in the states.  From this shift, we can reason that the Senate’s 
consitutency gains power over the removal of officers.  What will 
happen?  Executive officers will bow to Senators in ways they would 
not if they were only removable by the President.  As Madison once 
explained: 
If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: 
& Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the 
separation, that they should be independent of each other. The Executive 
could not be independent of the Legislure [sic], if dependent on the pleas-
ure of that branch for a re-appointment.  Why was it determined that the 
Judges should not hold their places by such a tenure?  Because they 
might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by an undue complai-
sance, and thus render the Legislature the virtual expositor, as well the 
maker of the laws. In like manner a dependence of the Executive on the 
Legislature, would render it the Executor as well as the maker of laws; & 
then according to the observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may 
be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner.212 
Applying this analysis to the question of legislative history, we 
begin with the notion that Congress creates legislative history.  Mem-
 
212 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 62, at 34 (statement of 
James Madison of Virginia, July 17, 1787) (emphasis added). 
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bers of Congress have the greatest incentive to represent states and 
localities within the national government.  This does not mean that 
they will in fact represent those constituencies,213 only that they have 
relatively greater structurally-induced incentives to effectuate that 
representation, as opposed to members of other departments.  Now, 
let us assume that the baseline practice is that courts give meaning to 
legislative history to understand the procedural posture and meaning 
of key disputed texts.  Now let us assume that courts were to change 
that practice and refuse to look at legislative history, even to resolve 
matters of conflicting texts.  We have shifted from a practice in which 
deciding voices come from state and local interests to one in which 
there are no popular voices, no relevant political constituencies.  We 
have moved the constitutional decisionmaker from one most respon-
sive to the people to the decisionmaker most removed from the peo-
ple.  As Senator Specter put it:  the risk is that judges “write their own 
law,” leaving the people’s law,214 and the people’s voice, at the side of 
the road.  Let us call this risk to majorities a Type I majoritarian risk. 
This risk is not only a risk to national majorities; far more counter-
intuitively, it is a federalism risk.  The risk is that judges fail to respect 
federalism interests implicit in our national governing structure when 
engaging in statutory interpretation.215  A judge asserting the power to 
“write the law” is a judge not only asserting the power of no constitu-
ency, but a judge who prefers a national constituency to one which is 
the most tied, in our national government, to state and local interests.  
This may be counterintuitive for those who associate federalism and 
textualism with “conservative” political positions.  In fact, the anti-
legislative history position is anti-federalist, where one means by anti-
federalist, that courts are taking positions against entities more likely 
to have state and local interests in mind (which is not to say that they 
do, just that they are more likely than any other national entity to 
have such interests directly in mind).216  In short, if one cares about 
 
213 Nor does it mean that the President has no such incentive to attend to state electorates, 
which the Electoral College clearly provides.  As a relative matter, however, we can say 
confidently that each Senator’s ties to his state and each Member’s ties to the district are 
stronger than that of the President. 
214 See Senator Specter quote discussed supra note 2. 
215 As a general rule, federalism risks have been noted by those who adopt traditionalist views 
of statutory interpretation.  See Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation:  Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 767, 788–89 (1991) (advocating a traditionalist view, contrary to dynamic and 
other theories, and noting federalism risks). 
216 There has been a long argument, of course, about whether Congress represents the 
states-as-states.  I do not doubt that, in some cases, members are willing to sacrifice a the-
oretical right of a state if their own state’s ox is not gored.  What I am saying is that, rela-
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federalism, one should counsel judges to look at legislative history, at 
the very least, one should expect that they should not blind them-
selves to it. 
Now, obviously, this analysis is subject to a baseline problem.  I am 
assuming the baseline of current practice in which legislative history 
is considered.  One might argue that the proper baseline should re-
ject history.  If we change the baseline and judges decide to consider 
legislative history, we shift from a practice governed by no 
consitutency to one in which constituency matters.  What was not 
considered a matter to be referred to the people now reflects their 
input.  The people are now in, not out.  We know from the question 
of judicial review that excessive majoritarianism incurs risks to indi-
viduals and minorities.  Let us call this a Type II minoritarian risk. 
How are we to assess these countervailing risks?  As an empirical 
matter we do not know which is more prevalent.  We do know which 
institution has the greater structural incentives to control these risks, 
however; Type I risks—risks to majorities—are not under judicial 
control, but Type II risks—risks to minorities—are far more familiar 
territory for the judiciary (and relatively less likely to be the concern 
of majoritarian bodies).  Courts hold no control over the political ef-
fect upon majorities of their statutory decisions; that is ultimately up 
to Congress.  If courts fail to look to legislative history and for that 
reason write “their own” law, their error may only be reversed with 
great difficulty, if at all, by returning to Congress.  More importantly, 
courts have no incentive to understand the whims or the substance of 
popular opinion;217 their entire job description, and reason for being, 
is to stand for principle, not majoritarian politics (which is not to say 
that they exist out of time or are impervious to dramatic political ef-
fects).  As Justice Scalia himself has argued, “Congress is . . . better 
equipped to inform itself of the ‘necessities’ of government; and 
since the factors bearing upon those necessities are both multifarious 
and (in the nonpartisan sense) highly political . . .  it is small wonder 
that we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress” on 
policy-making matters.218 
 
tive to other departments, members of Congress are closer to the states and more likely 
than other departments to know and represent the constituents’ view of states’ interests. 
217 As Judge Frank Easterbrook has written, “judicial predictions of how the legislature would 
have decided issues it did not in fact decide are bound to be little more than wild guess-
es . . . .”  Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983). 
218 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  That this quo-
tation involves the delegation of authority to the executive does not undermine the basic 
point about courts’ institutional competence more generally. 
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By contrast, courts have a relatively greater expertise and incentive 
than Congress to control for risks to minorities and individuals.  The 
courts are the only institution in our constitutional scheme with a 
structurally-induced incentive (life tenure and no constituency) to 
protect individuals and minorities—which is not to say that they will 
but that, as a relative matter, they have a greater incentive than other 
departments in cases of conflict between majorities and individuals or 
minorities.  The bottom line:  even if we were to assume a counter-
historical practice in which the courts never looked to legislative his-
tory as the proper baseline, if that were the case, the constitutional 
risks to individuals and minorities of considering legislative history 
are well within the competence and structural incentives for courts to 
manage.  If the separation of powers is a separation of representation, 
the practice of referring to legislative history and in particular of leg-
islative rules and procedure, should raise constitutional risks well 
within the courts’ ability to manage. 
Critics will argue that this analysis is entirely speculative:  we do 
not know the effect of judicial use of legislative history.  Perhaps the 
effect is to honor some political interest over others, the outliers on a 
committee,219 rent-seekers,220 or special interests who seek special fa-
vors.221  My point is that, for better or worse, even the outliers are con-
stituency-beholden interests, who act within a complex set of legisla-
tive procedures; in this sense, the statement of any group of Senators 
or even a single member has a relatively better, emphasis on relatively 
better, representational pedigree than any single judge or group of 
 
219 See Manning, supra note 4, at 688 (“[L]egislative committees disproportionately include 
members supported by the most interested interest groups . . . .”).  In fact, there is a 
strong argument that this conventional “wisdom” is not true, see  also KEITH KRIEBEL, 
PIVOTAL POLITICS 231–34 (1998). 
220 In its early days, textualists “decidedly felt the pull of the interest-group branch of public 
choice theory, which argues that legislation is an economic good purchased by interest 
groups, and that statutory outcomes often reflect little more than bargains struck among 
those groups.”  Manning, supra note 4, at 687.   
221 The Agriculture Committee does not necessarily have a “disproportionate” say in the 
elaboration of details of legislation.  Cf. Manning, supra note 4, at 719 (arguing that the 
Agriculture Committee will have a “disproportionate say in the elaboration of the details 
of farm policy”).  This precisely is the case because the process works forward from com-
mittee reports, not backward to committees.  The committee report is subject to a variety 
of internal and external “checks”; if minority voices disagree, it will be apparent on the 
face of the report; if the report yields principled objection by another committee, it may 
yield a different committee report.  Such reports may in fact result in amendments on the 
floor or a refusal to take up a bill.  There is no way of knowing, looking at the committee 
report itself, whether it has been significant in any of these decisions, although later legis-
lative consideration may make it clear.  One must see committee reports as part of that 
process. 
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judges.222  Lest one think this a radical position, it is precisely the posi-
tion the Supreme Court has taken in administrative law, applied to 
legislative history.  The Chevron doctrine223 holds that, when in doubt, 
the court defers to a few administrators the interpretation of a statute 
because those administrators ultimately have a relatively better politi-
cal pedigree224 than the court.  If that doctrine holds for administra-
tive law, there is no reason that it should not hold in the case of legis-
lative history.  If a court is willing in one case to defer to the executive 
branch because of its greater representational pedigree, why should it 
not do so for the legislative branch?225  Somewhat mysteriously, “tex-
tualists are relatively comfortable with the delegation of detail-filling 
authority to administrative agencies,”226 and yet resist reference to leg-
islative history and process. 
This argument should not be confused with the position that any 
and all legislative history deserves a free pass.  Purposivists have 
wrongly minimized the misuse of legislative history.  As I have argued 
elsewhere,227 unless this history is read with an eye to Congress’s rules 
and sequential procedures, the court’s version of that history may be 
pure fantasy.  It may even exacerbate the counter-majoritarian prob-
lem, by entrenching the position of a set of super-minority filibuster-
ers (for example, using “loser’s history” to support a judicial rul-
ing).228  Respecting the process requires, at a minimum, 
understanding that process.  At the same time, textualists should not 
minimize the problem of resolving textual, emphasis on textual, con-
flicts by recourse to canons, common law, and dictionaries.  The use 
 
222 I do not advocate the position that individual Senators’ or Members’ statements are relia-
ble legislative history.  In fact, elsewhere I argue that Members generally ignore these 
statements unless made by someone the group has granted authority over the bill, such as 
the bill manager. 
223 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
224 Sometimes this is referred to as accountability, a somewhat deceptive term.  Representa-
tional pedigree reflects potential, not actual, accountability.  See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, 
THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990) (arguing that representatives have to 
speculate and anticipate how their constituents will react). 
225 Indeed, to the extent the Supreme Court were to adopt a pro-Chevron, anti-legislative his-
tory stance, one would in effect be creating the worst position from a federalism stand-
point, where federalism is taken to mean the protection of state and local interests.  Del-
egating to administrative agencies, but not to Congress, the power to resolve ambiguities, 
would increase national power even more than a position in which neither were delegat-
ed that power. 
226 Manning, supra note 4, at 699. 
227 See Nourse, supra note 19, at 87 (arguing that purposivists’ ignorance of congressional 
rules in evaluating legislative history materials may lead them to make “very serious er-
rors”). 
228 For examples of this, see Nourse, supra note 19. 
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of canons and the “common law,” to the extent they diverge from the 
outcome dictated by legislative history, risks aggrandizing judicial 
power. 
At the end of the day, the question of legislative history should not 
be viewed in a vacuum; if courts do not use legislative history, they 
will use something else to resolve ambiguities and conflicts.  Textual-
ists urge that canons and judicial common law are constitutionally 
preferable to what has been termed “legislative common law.”229  Let 
no one be mistaken:  every constitutional argument that has been used to 
support the use of canons and the common law, rather than legislative history, 
can in fact be turned against the use of canons and common law.  Canons 
and “common law” amount to self-delegation; courts are using their 
own materials in ways that are not easily checked (does Congress real-
ly have the time to pass a statute saying do not use “expressio unius”?).  
Canons and “common law” are not “Law” under the Bicameralism 
Clause; they were never passed by both Houses or signed by the Pres-
ident (can you imagine Lyndon Johnson signing a “canon” statute?).  
Canons and the “common law” amount to judging in one’s own cause 
and thus create a “conflict of interest” in violation of the separation 
of powers.  Canons and the “common law” when used to rewrite stat-
utes amount to an improper use of “judicial power”, and are there-
fore means of judicial activism and lawmaking.  (As Karl Llewellyn 
explained long ago, picking and choosing the proper canon lies in 
the eye of the beholder).230 
It is here that textualists should be compelled to use their own 
methods.  For in the end, there is one difference that cannot be dis-
puted.  Canons and the “common law” do not appear in the text of 
Constitution.  If they did, the arguments would be entirely equivalent.  
If one cares about text, statutory or constitutional, then textualists 
must respond to the basic claim, supported by more general princi-
ples, that Congress’s procedures, at a minimum, are constitutionally 
protected and should therefore be respected under the Rulemaking 
Clause.  It is simply wrong to say that “the legislative power” does not 
include, or at the very least permit, the power of each House to create 
their own rules of proceedings, including rules providing for legisla-
 
229 See LIEBER, supra note 24 (“Of far greater importance is the body of the rules of proce-
dure and that usage which has gradually grown up as part of common law, by which the 
dispatch of parliamentary business and its protection against impassioned hurry are se-
cured . . . .”). 
230 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950) (illustrating how “there 
are two opposing canons on almost every point.”). 
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tive history.231  If those rules help to resolve difficult constitutional 
cases, then judges should use them; in fact, they are bound by the 
Constitution at the very least to respect them enough to know them. 
CONCLUSION 
It is time to retire the all-or-nothing 1980s debate about the con-
stitutionality of legislative history.  These arguments have been gen-
erally ignored by the vast majority of judges and the Supreme Court.  
New developments in the theory of statutory interpretation, including 
decision process theory, help to sharpen the critique of legislative his-
tory but at the same time retire the constitutional questions as they 
have been posed.  When applied to legislative rules and proceedings, 
the arguments against the constitutionality of legislative history, are 
not supported by the text, history or structure of the Constitution. 
Questions do remain, but they are different questions than the 
ones previously asked about legislative history.  First, there are im-
portant questions about particular practices, “as applied” rather than 
“facial” attacks on legislative history abuse.  For example, can it possi-
bly be constitutional for judges to rely upon claims made by filibuster-
ing minorities?  Does it violate Article I, Section 5, for a court to ig-
nore Congress’s “rules of its proceedings” in its use of legislative 
history in a particular case?232 
Second, these more practical questions invite larger theoretical 
inquiries.  Faithfulness to Congress has been woefully undertheorized 
in the legislative sphere, even as it has been overanalyzed in the con-
stitutional one.  Does faithfulness to Congress require faithfulness to 
Article I, Section 5?  More generally, at a meta-level, it may well be 
that certain theories of the Constitution, like common law constitu-
tionalism or popular constitutionalism or even originalism, should 
provide a stronger defense of legislative history or rules as a part of 
their theoretical missions.  Indeed, although it is outside the scope of 
this paper, once we have put to the side questions of legislative histo-
ry as an all or nothing proposition, it becomes possible to imagine 
competing constitutional theories of legislative history, whether pop-
ular, common law, or originalist. 
 
231 See Roberts, supra note 4, at 503 (asserting Congress’s Article I Section 5 power to deter-
mine its own rules of proceedings). 
232 For potential examples of these problems, see Nourse, supra note 19. 
